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Abstract 
In this thesis, I examine the political theories of Sir 
Robert Filmer, John Locke, and James Tyrrell and, in turn, 
compare their respective conceptions of property which are 
at the foundation of their political theories. This 
political debate about property must be set amongst the 
political circumstances of the exclusion crisis. Arising 
from the Whig-Tory division, which arose in part from the 
Popish Plot, Filmer, Locke, and Tyrrell reveal the ideas of 
the parties they represented. Locke and Tyrrell, as Whig 
representatives, refuted the patriarchal theory of Filmer's 
Patriarcha, representative of the Tory party. In refuting 
Filmer, Locke and Tyrrell reveal the Whig movement from 
arguments focusing on history to their acceptance of natural 
law political theory. As natural law theorists, there are 
many similarities between the property theories of Locke and 
Tyrrell as presented in the Two Treatises and Patriarcha non 
Monarcha. However, in contrast to Locke, Tyrrell presents a 
definition of property which focuses on economic (and not 
ideological) rights and claims that occupancy is a right to 
property. In addition, he presents an argument in which an 
absolute monarchy can be accepted as legitimate, which Locke 
would never accept. I conclude that the work of James 
Tyrrell is most representative of the period's political 
debates and explain why. 
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Introduction: The Exclusion Crisis, the Formation 
of Political Party Ideologies, and Seventeenth-Century 
Liberties 
In October of 1678, the Cavalier Parliament 
investigated a claim by Titus Oates that there was a Popish 
Plot to assassinate the king, Charles II. In the case of 
the king's death, his Catholic brother, James, Duke of York, 
would succeed to the throne. The already strong English 
fear of Catholicism ran rampant throughout the country in a 
period which would come to be known as the Exclusion Crisis. 
The Exclusion Crisis covered a period from 1678 to 
1681, in which three Parliaments were called and convened. 
All three of these parliaments were linked by exclusion 
bills which, if they were passed, would have kept James from 
succeeding to the throne. Although exclusion had been 
considered since at least the mid-1670s, an exclusion bill 
was introduced in the first exclusion Parliament.1 After a 
Parliament was dissolved on January 24, 1679, a new 
Parliament met for the first time on March 6, 1679, 
introducing an exclusion bill in May. Between these two 
parliaments, the Duke of York was forced into exile, in part 
because the Commons declared that Catholicism gave 
encouragement to the plotters and insinuated that the Duke 
1. Tim Harris, Politics Under the Later Stuarts: Party 
Conflict in a Divided Society, 1660-1715 (New York, New 
York: Longman, 1993), 83. 
1 
may have been involved in the plot himself. The first 
exclusion parliament was porogued before the bill of 
exclusion could go very far. Parliament met once again on 
October 21, 1680. During this second exclusion parliament, 
a similar exclusion bill reached the House of Lords, where 
it was rejected in November. A third exclusion parliament, 
also known as the Oxford Parliament, met in 1681. During 
the Oxford Parliament, a third exclusion bill was read. 
Once again, the bill failed. From 1678 to 1681, a period 
known as the Exclusion crisis, three parliaments met, each 
introducing a bill of exclusion, all of which failed. 
Despite the controversy over excluding the Duke of York 
from succession to the throne, the period did not just 
revolve around ideas of succession. In Politics and Opinion 
in Crisis, 1678-1681, Mark Knights argues that exclusion 
implies the crisis was only parliamentary and would best be 
reserved for the time from November 1680 to the dissolution 
of the Oxford Parliament in 1681. Indeed, he notes "the 
depth and complexity of what was the critical period in 
Charles II's reign, when politics and opinion were in 
crisis."2 During the entire time span, contemporaries 
perceived a crisis while the nation "drifted slowly towards 
violent unrest. 11 3 Disorder was looming on the nation, 
2. Mark Knights, Politics and Opinion in Crisis, 1678-
1681 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), 4-5. 
3. Ibid. I 3. 
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centering on issues of dissent, the factioning of political 
parties, and a fierce battle between notions of liberty and 
tyranny. 
During the exclusion crisis, modern political parties 
were beginning to take shape. While much attention has been 
devoted to this period as a focal point for the arising of 
political parties, especially the Whig party, Knights claims 
that this attention has diverted scholars from the real 
issues of the time.4 Rather than devoting so much attention 
to the growth of political parties, historians should pay 
more attention to the issues of conflict in England during 
the late seventeenth century. Tim Harris, for instance, 
maintains a study of the period must emphasize what is new 
to the time of the exclusion crisis, the depth of the 
constitutional crisis and fears of arbitrary government.5 
Despite these comments, many historians believe the 
beginnings of modern political parties can be observed. 
There was "a polarisation between two fairly-well identified 
sides, both of which had distinct political ideologies and 
possessed a rudimentary degree of organization," signalling 
the emergence of political society during the exclusion 
crisis.6 The Whig party and the Tory party emerged from the 
4. Ibid., 5. 
5. Harris, "'Lives, Liberties, and Estates': Rhetorics 
of Liberty in the Reign of Charles II," The Politics of 
Religion in Restoration England, ed. Tim Harris, Paul 
Seaward, Mark Goldie (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil 
Blackwell, 1990), 218. 
6. Harris, Politics Under the Later Stuarts, 82. 
3 
·exclusion crisis. 
In addition to the anti-catholicism of the supposed 
Popish Plot, and the attempt to exclude a Catholic successor 
from the throne, attitudes towards protestant dissent can be 
seen as a strong issue between the two parties. Like 
succession and arbitrary government, however, dissent was 
just one issue that 
helped to divide the nation during the period and held 
different sway at different times . . • all distorted 
by local and personal factors, and ... not very 
useful to try to prioritize them in sweeping 
generalizations.7 
Concerns of the Popish Plot and fears of arbitrary 
government led the Whigs to a heightened fear of papery. 
The Whigs equated Catholicism with the reign of Mary 
Tudor, England's last Catholic ruler, who had heretics 
burned at the stake, and came to believe that a Catholic 
ruler would necessarily be absolute, like Louis XIV of 
France.a The Whigs believed a Catholic ruler would be 
absolute because the only way he would be able to force his 
subjects to follow Rome would be to end the rule of law by 
keeping a standing army. The Whigs appeared 
constitutionally conservative because they feared a Catholic 
monarch would ruin a balance of power between king and 
parliament. 
Among the leaders of the constitutionally conservative 
7. Knights, 365. 
8. Harris, Politics Under the Later Stuarts, 86. 
4 
Whigs was the Earl of Shaftesbury. Although Shaftesbury, a 
proponent of exclusion, was not the leader of the Whigs, he 
did hold several Whig clubs.9 By holding these clubs, the 
Earl revealed his power of organization--a hallmark of 
modern political parties. He also had briefly been part of 
the republican regimes of the 1650s, an indication that 
leading constitutionally conservative Whigs must 
be judged with wariness, for "it would have been a tactical 
mistake for the exclusionists to admit that their real aim 
was a fundamental restructuring of the powers of the 
monarchy."10 As a supporter of the regimes of the 
Interregnum, Shaftesbury revealed his belief in Parliament 
as the representative of the people, whose acts were based 
upon consent given by the people able to vote.11 Other than 
his representation of the Whigs as believers in the 
authority of Parliament and as an organized party, 
Shaftesbury was very active in encouraging pope-burnings, 
riots, and petitioning. By encouraging these actions, he 
demonstrated his leadership within the Whig party as a 
populist party; a party which stood for the rights of the 
English people against popery and arbitrary government. 
The Tory party stood in opposition to the Whig party. 
Essentially an anti-populist party, more elitist than the 
9. Ibid., 84. 
10. Ibid., 87. 
11. Ibid., 89. 
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Whigs, the Tories opposed exclusion in opposition to the 
Whigs, but were not as well organized as their rivals.12 
Unlike the Whigs in another respect, the Tories did not have 
anyone who stood out as a leader of their party and did not 
see themselves as a party but as people fulfilling the 
loyalty they owed to the Crown.13 Like the Whigs, who posed 
as a party dedicated to the constitution, the Tories also 
possessed a distinctive identity. The Tory identity 
"centered around an attachment to Church and State as by 
law established. 11 14 Making conditional statements about 
absolute monarchy, the Tories wanted the English people to 
obey the legal government of England, even if that meant 
obeying a Catholic ruler. 
Although both the Whigs and Tories had distinct issues 
which they supported, it is best not to look at the conflict 
between these two parties during the Exclusion Crisis as one 
between liberty and tyranny. Although, as Knights suggests, 
this distinction may be best "for those who espoused 
polarized ideological positions," most members of either 
party were not strictly Whiggish or Tory.15 In fact, 
exclusion was not the dividing issue because a Whig-Tory 
division, while describing the outcome of the crisis, was 
not the dividing line, but a dividing line.16 They were not 
12. Ibid., 94, 101. 
13. Ibid. I 95. 
14. Ibid. I 96. 
15. Knights, 358. 
16. Ibid., 356. 
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in direct conflict because both parties believed in the 
established Church and State. The problem arose between the 
two parties because, at a time when the line of succession 
to the throne was being threatened, they could not reach a 
consensus on as to what was the established Church and 
State. Although the Whigs made some concessions, including 
the belief that the established church should be expanded to 
include the moderate protestant dissenters, this was a 
limited expansion. Neither party was all-inclusive; they 
remained at odds. Generally speaking, the Whigs believed in 
the constitution and the authority of Parliament, fearing 
the results of a possible Catholic ruler, while the Tories 
believed in the obedience the English owed to their monarch, 
whether that monarch was catholic or not. Historically, the 
Whigs have since been seen as defenders of the propertied 
class against a threat posed by arbitrary government and the 
Tories have been seen as enemies of liberty, defenders of 
divine right and succession. 
It would be misleading to argue that the Whigs only 
took a stance as defenders of liberty against the Tory 
interest in defending an absolute monarchy. As Tim Harris 
explains, liberty was a concept which did not hold the same 
meaning for all sectors of the population. Both the Whigs 
and the Tories held views of liberty: conflicting views. As 
Harris writes, 
7 
we cannot see the conflict of the 1680s in terms of a 
simple struggle between liberty and tyranny, between 
legal and arbitrary government. What we have are 
competing conceptions of liberty, discrete visions of 
how 'lives, liberties, and estates' were best secured. 
These visions were inevitably worked out and defended 
in terms of an appeal to the law, the ancient 
constitution and Magna Carta and natural justice.17 
By the late seventeenth century, both parties generally 
agreed that Englishmen had rights which should be protected 
by the government. These rights included life, liberty, and 
the protection of their property. 
Property may have been the most important of the rights 
which Englishmen felt the government needed to protect. 
Property rights were important enough that everyone in 
politics wanted to see them secured.18 Protection of 
property rights would serve as a bridge to the security of 
other rights; by the time of the exclusion crisis, all 
liberties were considered part of a person's property. 
John Cowell's definition of the word property, given in 
the law dictionary The Interpreter, first appeared in 1607. 
Cowell, Regius Professor of Civil Law in the University of 
Cambridge, made an important contribution to political 
science with his legal definition of property because it was 
the "earliest explicit definition" of the word.19 His 
17. Harris, "'Lives, Liberties, and Estates,"' 236. 
18. Ibid. I 220. 
19. G. E. Aylmer, "The Meaning and Definition of 
'Property' in Seventeenth-Century England," Past and Present 
86 (Feb. 1980): 87. 
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definition was debated by Members of Parliament in 1610, the 
first Parliament of James I. G. E. Aylmer, in "The Meaning 
and Definition of 'Property• in Seventeenth-Century 
England," quotes cowell's definition: 
Propertie signif ieth the highest right that a man hath 
or can have to any thing; which is in no way depending 
upon any other man's courtesie. And this none in our 
kingdom can be said to have in any lands or tenements, 
but only the king in the right of his crowne.20 
After providing this explanation of the concept of property, 
Cowell proceeded to explain in The Interpreter that the king 
possessed the only property rights because lands of the 
realm were held in fee. Nevertheless, property was included 
as a part of common law, used for "that right in lands and 
tenements that common persons have. 11 21 The start which 
Cowell gave to the definition of property began the 
seventeenth century debate of the concept. 
Cowell's definition of property established him as both 
"the originator of the definition of absolute individual 
ownership" and "a would-be absolutist. 11 22 His stance as an 
absolutist can be seen when considering that Parliament 
debated this definition during the reign of James I, 
England's theorizer of divine right. Despite the debate in 
Parliament, in the early seventeenth century, there seemed 
to be little anxiety "over the legitimization of private 
20. Quoted in Ibid., 88. 
21. Quoted in Ibid., 88. 
22. Ibid., 97. 
9 
property. 11 23 By the time of the Glorious Revolution, 
however, when Locke presented his property theory, 
definitions of property changed into a justification of 
personal liberties. 
As property theory changed during the seventeenth 
century from supporting the power of the sovereign into a 
justification of personal liberties, historians have come to 
regard it as a revelation of what and why Englishmen were 
fighting. In a period of English history which experienced 
dramatic changes, moving from the Civil Wars to the 
Commonwealth to the Exclusion Crisis to the Glorious 
Revolution, property theory "appear(s] to explain so 
much. 11 24 During this time period, the preservation of 
political liberty was associated with the security of 
properties. 
In her presentation "'Property' in seventeenth-Century 
English Political Thought," Margaret Sampson argues that the 
concept of property during the period served as a bridge 
between economics and ideology. She contends that by the 
end of the seventeenth century property referred to "rights 
in or over things" rather than to the things themselves, but 
was increasingly becoming an economic term.25 If property 
23. Margaret Sampson, "'Property• in Seventeenth-
Century English Political Thought," Proceedings of the 
Folger Institute, Volume 3 (The Folger Shakespeare Library, 
1990), 263. 
24. Ibid., 259. 
25. Ibid., 260. 
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refers to "rights in or over things" rather than to the 
things themselves, it is a word denoting liberty because it 
signifies that people have a right to something. In 
addition, a right in some thing signifies that a person has 
an economic interest in that thing because they have a right 
to the produce of it. 
Property theory as a defense of individual liberties 
arose from legal definitions of property given during the 
seventeenth century, which reveal a dramatic break from the 
earliest legal definition of property. Legal definitions of 
property after Cowell's first started to appear in the 1620s 
and became commonplace by the 1650s. One lawyer, William 
Style, published collections of law reports during this 
period, using recent legal decisions in his definition. In 
Style's A Practical Register (1670), the work of a judge 
from 1648 is referenced in deciding that 
the king is thought of simply as another potential 
owner, competing for title with other individual 
owners, one who indeed has a right to make a way for 
his subjects to go across someone else's land but has 
no more title in that land as a whole than anyone 
else.26 
Style's decision reveals a dramatic break from the 
definition of property given by Cowell. Cowell argued that 
the king was the only person entitled to property rights; 
sixty years later, Style argues that the king is not 
entitled to more property rights than any other "potential 
26. Quoted in Aylmer, 94. 
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owner." The difference between Cowell's definition of 
property and Style's decision regarding the king's status as 
a property owner is similar to the much larger shift taking 
place in legal decisions during the seventeenth century. 
The break between Cowell and Style represents the much 
larger ideological split between common law and feudal law. 
While common law supported the endowment of individuals with 
a "Romanized form of private property or dominion," feudal 
law recognized ownership of goods but not in "the concept of 
a right in land good against the world."27 The distinction 
of property rights found in feudal and common law reveals a 
paradox of English legal tradition because common law 
emerged from feudal origins. While feudal law stressed the 
importance of the crown, common law was becoming more and 
more important as the seventeenth century progressed because 
it could be used as a justification of personal liberties. 
The confusion between common law and feudal law was 
highlighted by English political changes during the 
seventeenth century. Strikingly, the Interregnum saw the 
wide acceptance of the extinction of sociability in a state 
of nature and natural property by the Fall, leaving 
Hobbesian man.28 In contrast, by the 1680s, natural right 
to private property replaced the civil right of private 
property present during the Interregnum. This replacement 
27. Sampson, 263. 
28. Ibid. I 272. 
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occurred as a fulfillment of the need for "a revolutionary 
political theory which could oust a papist successor or king 
without upsetting the existing laws and rights of 
property."29 In essence, the change in property theory 
during the 1680s towards a justification of personal 
liberties was a result of the Exclusion Crisis. Drawn from 
contemporary language and moral principles based on natural 
law, it was hard to ignore property theories which justified 
individual liberties because the theories were based on a 
foundation which had wide credibility.JO Nevertheless, as 
Aylmer points out, "the word was not given legal definition 
until remarkably late."31 By the time of the exclusion 
crisis, natural law theorists were able to draw upon 
accepted principles of natural and common law to justify 
their property theory. By the end of the seventeenth 
century, the confusion between common and feudal law was 
overshadowed by the popular acceptance of common law. 
The Whigs used the language of a defense of property 
rights extensively during the exclusion crisis. Including 
this language in the rhetoric of the time, the Whigs helped 
to increase its use during the late 1670s and early 1680s as 
a reason for defense against arbitrary government. The 
party used a rhetoric involving property rights because they 
29. Ibid. 
30. Ibid. 
31. Aylmer, 87. 
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perceived the Popish Plot as a threat to the landed class 
under a popish successor, who would necessarily be 
absolute.32 The Whigs did not just represent the 
propertied, however. By including an argument that property 
was more than just the possession of goods, Whigs appealed 
to all social groups. For example, nonconformists adopted 
the Whig party because of the religious persecution of the 
Restoration.33 Just the presence of an absolute monarch, 
Catholic or not, would pose a threat to individual political 
liberties. By defending property rights, the Whigs felt 
they were presenting an argument which should be accepted 
against a Catholic successor. 
In opposition, while the Tories also felt they were 
"true defenders of English liberties guaranteed by law," 
they felt the Whigs were the real threat to property 
rights.34 Assuming they were defending men of property 
against the threat of the masses, the Tories argued their 
opposition was "laying a snare for people of liberty and 
property. 11 35 The Tories feared the actions and the language 
of the Whigs because they felt that party would eliminate 
the true English government in a arbitrary, unconstitutional 
way. 
In order to express their political stance to the 
32. Harris, "'Lives, Liberties, and Estatates,'" 221. 
33. Ibid. I 223. 
34. Ibid. I 219. 
35. Ibid. I 231. 
14 
public, the Tory party published Sir Robert Filmer's 
Patriarcha in 1680.36 Filmer, "an uncompromising 
absolutist," most fully expressed his ideas in Patriarcha, 
easily his most famous work.37 Resembling the ideas of the 
higher clergy before the Civil War, he argued that God gave 
the king an absolute power over the state, which can be 
viewed as the king's family. By claiming the king has an 
absolute power over the state, just as a father has 
an absolute power over his family, Filmer presented the 
patriarchal view of society within Patriarcha. In fact, 
"Filmerism was above all things the exaltation of the 
family: it made the rules of domestic society into 
36. Notice, however, that most sources just accept that 
Filmer was published as a representative spokesman for the 
Tory party by members of that party. See, for example, 
Gordon J. Schochet's Patriarchalism and Political Thought 
(New York, New York: Basic Books, 1975), where Schochet 
writes "in 1679, a number of people recognized that the 
issue behind the debates in the Exclusion crisis were 
similar to the conflicts of the 1640s, and a great many 
tracts and pamphlets from the earlier crisis were reprinted 
• . . In 1680 Patriarcha was finally published" (119). A 
specific mention of publishers can be found in James Daly's 
Sir Robert Filmer and English Political Thought (Toronto, 
Canada: Toronto University Press, 1979), where Daly tells 
us that the Patriarcha published in 1680 was brought out by 
Richard Chiswell, although his "identification with royalism 
was not so strong; he leaned heavily towards theological 
publication" (145). In 1684, Daly relates, Patriarcha was 
published again by Richard Royston, who was a royalist 
"'publisher to three kings' and had been denounced in 1645 
as a 'constant factor for all scandalous books and papers 
against the proceedings of parliament'" (145). 
37. Johann P. Sommerville, "Introduction," Patriarcha 
and Other Writings (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), xi, xiv. 
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principles of political science."38 By arguing that the 
king was the absolute father over his country, Filmer 
attempted to show that power did not reside in the people 
and the government did not arise from their consent. To 
present a contrary argument, Filmer believed, was to present 
an argument as "absurd as any ever uttered."39 Filmer used 
patriarchal theory to present his belief that without strong 
fatherly and royal power, manifest in the king, man's love 
of liberty would lead to anarchy.40 Any inroads to 
monarchial power he feared would lead to mob rule, as did 
the Tories at the time of the exclusion crisis. 
Patriarchal theory had become popular in early 
seventeenth century England where works like James VI and 
I's True Law of Free Monarchies used it against claims which 
said that power came from the subject.41 Filmer's work, a 
major part of the patriarchal tradition and created by the 
most famous and popular of the patriarchal theorists, could 
be used by the Tory party to counter the arguments of the 
Whigs, who did believe that the king was subject to common 
law.42 In writing Patriarcha, Filmer intended to dispel the 
38. Peter Laslett, "Sir Robert Filmer: The Man Versus 
the Whig Myth," The William and Mary Quarterly 5, 3 (1948), 
544. 
39. George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory, 
(New York, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1949), 513. 
40. Sommerville, xxii. 
41. Ibid., xviii. 
42. However, it must be noted that Filmer became the 
most famous patriarchalist after his death, when Patriarcha 
was published. 
16 
"common opinion" that 
'Mankind is naturally endowed and born with freedom 
from all subjection, and at liberty to choose what form 
of government it please, and that the power which any 
one man hath over others was at the first by human 
right bestowed according to the discretion of the 
multitude. 1 43 
Filmer opposed this opinion because 
it is not to be found in the ancient Fathers and 
doctors of the primitive church. It contradicts the 
doctrine and history of the Holy Scriptures, the 
constant practice of all ancient monarchies and the 
very principles of the law of nature. It is hard to 
say whether it be more erroneous in divinity or 
dangerous in policy.44 
This "common opinion" became the standard Whig position by 
the time of the exclusion crisis, thirty years after Filmer 
stated it. 
There is some scholarly debate as to whether Filmer's 
ideas really did represent the standard Tory political 
position. Peter Laslett, for instance, writes 
It is well known that in republishing Filmer, the 
Tories, champions of the Monarchy against Shaftesbury 
and the Whig Exclusionists, scored a notable propaganda 
victory.45 
He continues by claiming that the exclusion crisis can be 
referred to as "the Filmer controversy of 1679-81," because 
after Patriarcha was published in January of 1680, there was 
43. Robert Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Writings, ed. 
Johann P. Sommerville (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 2. 
44. Ibid., 2. 
45. Laslett, "Introduction," Two Treatises of 
Government, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University 
Press, 1963), 64. 
17 
"an enormous growth of Filmer's influence which went on 
during the rest of that year. 11 46 Knights, who has spent 
some time studying the pamphlet wars of the Exclusion 
crisis, agrees with Laslett. He explains that, while the 
publishing of Patriarcha was part of a larger trend of 
loyalist reliance on works from between 1640 and 1660, "It 
is easy to see how Filmer's Patriarcha was published as 
part, or indeed, as the embodiment, of this loyalist attack 
in the autumn and winter of 1679-1680. 11 47 A strong case can 
be made that Filmer's ideas represented the Tory views at 
the time when Patriarcha was published.48 
In contrast to Laslett and Knight's ideas of Filmer's 
influence rests the opinion of James Daly, who denies that 
Filmer's work was representative of the Tory party. Daly 
believes the parliamentary debates over exclusion "show no 
evidence of Tory use of Filmerian ideas, and could hardly do 
so."49 In fact, "In view of the traditional story, it may 
46. Ibid., 67, 72-3. 
47. Knights, 249. 
48. There is some debate as to the dates of Filmer's 
composition of Patriarcha. In "Sir Robert Filmer: The Man 
Versus the Whig Myth," Laslett claims that it was written in 
the late 1630s and early 1640s. An alternative dating is 
provided by Sommerville in his "Introduction" to Patriarcha 
and Other Writings. In his introduction, Sommerville 
presents his idea that "Perhaps the first two chapters of 
Patriarcha were composed in the 1620s and the third chapter 
about 1630" (xxxiv). John M. Wallace, James Daly, and 
Richard Tuck have also provided different dates for the 
work's composition. 
49. James Daly, Sir Robert Filmer and English Political 
Thought (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 
1979), 146. 
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be surprising that Filmer made so little impact on the 
exclusiondebates."50 Nevertheless, even Daly admits that 
Filmer must have some basis as a Tory spokesman because 
Patriarcha appeared twice during the exclusion 
parliaments.51 
Whether Filmer represented the standard Tory position 
or not, it is certain that he became famous because he was 
refuted in detail by John Locke, Algernon Sidney, and James 
Tyrrell. Filmer tried to keep Patriarcha (originally 
written in several stages in the late 1630s or early 1640s) 
from being published within his lifetime.52 He intended to 
circulate the manuscript by having friends pass it to their 
friends.53 Because of its method of circulation and 
Filmer's pains to keep if from being published, it is not 
known why Patriarcha was written, who read it, or what the 
audience was supposed to think, although it must have 
labeled Filmer as an "extreme conservative."54 Filmer was 
considered so conservative that he suffered because of his 
royalist beliefs during the Interregnum; he spent over 
eighteen months in prison, lost over 1500 pounds of personal 
wealth, experienced damage to his home, and felt exactions 
50. Ibid. 
51. Ibid., 145-146. Daly contends that most purchasers 
of Patriarcha were Whigs, rather than Tories. This 
contention only makes sense because the Whigs had to argue 
against the Tory stance, Tories did not have to defend 
themselves within their own party. 
52. Laslett, "Sir Robert Filmer," 524. 
53. Ibid. I 532. 
54. Ibid. 
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of military and fiscal authorities during the Civil Wars.SS 
Filmer died on May 30, 1653, nearly thirty years before 
Patriarcha was published. 
When Filmer's work was published during the exclusion 
crisis his ideas were not "associated with an unpopular and 
even persecuted minority."S6 Because his work did not 
represent the minority during the exclusion crisis, and 
because, according to Laslett•s astonishing claim, Filmer 
may be the "only one even reasonably effective theoretical 
conservative in the political history of the English 
speaking peoples," his work was open for attack to provide a 
foundation for the opposition.S7 By writing in refutation 
of Filmer, while representing the Whigs, Locke, Sidney, and 
Tyrrell helped establish a foundation for their party's 
political argument and their own reputations as political 
theorists. 
Of these three men, Sidney was the only republican. In 
his major work, Discourses Concerning Government, he reveals 
both his republican interests and his step-by-step 
refutation of Filmer.SS As a republican member of 
parliament, Sidney fought for the "good 
SS. Ibid., S40. 
S6. Ibid., S23. 
S7. Ibid. 
sa. For a more detailed discussion of Sidney during 
this period, see Jonathon Scott's Algernon Sidney and the 
Restoration Crisis, 1677-1683 {Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991). Although this work has 
been criticized for overemphasizing a republican interest 
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old cause," believing that religion was not important to 
political man's motivation but only "a pretext for the 
recovery of their liberty and ancient privileges."59 For 
Sidney, religion was his own and should be removed from the 
realm of politics, although he perceived Patriarcha as a 
threat because it argued for a popish successor.60 In the 
sense that he did not believe religion to be important in 
the realm of politics, Sidney was not a typical Whig. 
Unlike other Whigs, he did not see religion as the central 
issue of the exclusion crisis. He differed enough from 
other Whigs that he opposed Shaftesbury and cannot really be 
classified as either exclusionist or anti-exclusionist.61 
As a republican, Sidney was not a mainstream Whig.62 
While an established republican and member of 
Parliament, Sidney's political writing was not influential 
among the Whig party, and an "exclusion of exclusion," it 
has been praised for Scott's contribution to historiography 
because it reveals Sidney acted independently of Shaftesbury 
and was an "old-cause" man rather than a Whig. Scott 
devotes two chapters of the book to discussing the arguments 
present in Sidney's Discourses Concerning Government and 
focuses on issues of popery and arbitrary government. 
59. Knights, 137, 142. 
60. Blair Worden, "The Commonwealth Kidney of Algernon 
Sidney," Journal of British Studies 24, 1 (1985), 22. Also 
see J.G.A. Pocock, "England's Cato: The Virtues and 
Fortunes of Algernon Sidney," Historical Journal 37, 4 
(1994) I 926. 
61. Harris, Politics Under the Later Stuarts, 284. 
Knights, 217. 
62. See Worden, 27-28, who claims Sidney was not 
championed until after his death and then by radical Whigs 
who downplayed his republicanism. 
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enough before the eighteenth century to be considered for 
its statements about the exclusion crisis. Because Sidney's 
thesis rests on a "one-sided bargain that leaves kings 
permanently subject to the will of the sovereign people," at 
a time when the monarchy would not be eliminated, his 
contemporaries could not accept his writings.63 
Indeed, his main claim to fame is not his work but his trial 
and execution for an alleged role in the Rye House Plot of 
1683: an alleged attempt to assassinate Charles II as he 
passed the Rye House from his castle to London.64 His death 
turned him into a martyr for the Whig cause, which was 
perpetuated by the posthumous publication of Discourses 
Concerning Government in 1698. Although he offers something 
as a republican, Sidney is otherwise ineffectual as a 
political theorist.65 
Sidney's Discourses, "a rather rambling and ill 
constructed book," has been criticized because it does not 
add "any significant addition to political ideas generally 
familiar in the seventeenth century. 11 66 Even republicanism, 
the issue closest to Sidney's heart, could not establish him 
as a vital political theorist among his contemporaries 
because his idealization of an aristocratic republic was 
never practical. As a republican, Sidney was less original 
63. Pocock, 925. Worden, 16. 
64. See Worden for Sidney's role in the Rye House Plot. 
65. Pocock, 915. 
66. Sabine, 508. 
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and less important than James Harrington and, by the end of 
the Glorious Revolution, became part of a tradition which 
was eliminated as a serious political system outside of the 
United States. Republicanism was dead at the end of the 
Glorious Revolution because "no one worth mentioning wished 
to try the sad experiment of the Commonwealth."67 As an 
author and as a republican, Sidney was not an effective 
political theorizer for the issues of liberty at the time of 
the exclusion crisis. 
Partly because of the strength of his myth as a martyr 
for the Whig cause, and as a political theorist of rebellion 
in late seventeenth century England, Sidney is worth 
studying because he reveals the relationship between 
politics and ideas at his time.68 In fact, it has been said 
that Sidney's importance was as a "political actor. 11 69 
Like Sidney's Discourses Concerning Government, John 
Locke's Two Treatises of Government was written in 
refutation of Filmer's Patriarcha. Unlike Sidney, however, 
the alternative political theory which Locke provides is 
effective as a representation of the Whig position and as a 
useful replacement for Filmer's patriarchal theory. Writing 
as a spokesman for the Earl of Shaftesbury, Locke's Two 
Treatises expose him as a def ender of revolution and a 
67. Ibid., 517. 
68. This is an argument that Worden develops in further 
detail. 
69. Pocock, 916. 
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contributor to the Whig-Tory battle of the exclusion 
crisis.70 
Until the twentieth century, it was assumed that Locke 
wrote the Two Treatises to justify the Glorious Revolution. 
After all, the book was not published until 1690, and Locke 
writes in his preface that he hopes his work is 
sufficient to establish the Throne of our Great 
Restorer, Our present King William; to make good his 
Title, in the Consent of the People ••. And to 
justifie to ,the World, the People of England, whose 
love of their Just and Natural Rights, with their 
Resolution to preserve them, saved the Nation when it 
was on the very brink of Slavery and Ruine.71 
Despite Locke's statement, Laslett argued in his 
introduction to an edition of the work that the "Two 
Treatises is an Exclusion Tract, not a Revolution 
pamphlet."72 Through his research, Laslett determined that 
Locke drafted most of the Two Treatises in the autumn and 
winter of 1679-1680. 
Despite what has been called "unrefuted bibliographical 
arguments" made by Laslett, at least one other dating has 
been provided for Locke's drafting of the Two Treatises.73 
Richard Ashcraft argues that Locke composed the work after 
70. For a more detailed explanation of Locke's 
relationship with Shaftesbury, see Richard Ashcraft's 
Revolutionary Politics and Locke's "Two Treatises of 
Government" (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1986). 
71. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, revised 
edition, ed. and intr. Peter Laslett, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1963), preface. 
72. Laslett, "Introduction," 75. 
73. Knights, 255. 
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the dissolution of the Oxford Parliament in 1681, as a 
justification for a planned revolution.74 Although 
Ashcraft's dating has been criticized as being reached too 
hastily, it is important because it casts Locke in a 
revolutionary role, as spokesman for the Earl of 
Shaftesbury.75 Rather than lending credence to the Two 
Treatises as an abstract book of political philosophy, 
Ashcraft's dating shows that Locke's work cannot be removed 
from the political circumstances (the Exclusion crisis and 
the falling of Whigs in Parliament) in which it was written. 
No matter what date is accepted for when Locke wrote 
the Two Treatises (and there seems to be no way to say which 
of the earlier two datings is correct) it was written in 
partial refutation of Filmer around the time of the 
exclusion crisis. Varied statements have been given to 
explain why Locke wrote against Filmer. For example, Sabine 
claims that Locke's political theory was "superficially 
simple" and took advantage of "poor Filmer, who had the 
merit of being absurd and of appearing more absurd than he 
was"; whereas Laslett credits Filmer as 
the man of the moment, a formidable and growing force 
with those whose political positions mattered, and 
representing in himself the ipissima verba of the 
established order. It was because this was so that 
Locke found himself impelled to write on this subject, 
and for that reason Filmer's thinking lies directly 
behind his political doctrines.76 
74. See Ashcraft's Revolutionary Politics, especially 
Chapter 7. 
75. Knights, 255. 
76. Sabine, 524. Laslett, "Introduction," 50. 
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Accepting Daly's moderate argument that there is no smoke 
without fire, so that Filmer must have represented the Tory 
position to a degree, Locke wrote in refutation of Filmer 
because he was accessible and presented political ideas in 
disagreement with his own ideas. Probably written during 
the pamphlet wars of 1679-1680, Locke's thesis "answered 
almost every point raised by loyalist pamphleteers," 
including "the ideas of the equality of man, the formation 
of government by popular consent."77 Because he wrote 
against Filmer, Locke can be seen as a champion of the Whig 
cause. 
The First Treatise or, "In the Former, The False 
Principles and Foundation of Sir Robert Filmer, And His 
Followers, Are Discredited and Overthrown" was devoted to 
countering Filmer's argument, as presented in Patriarcha, 
nearly step-by-step. Locke begins the First Treatise by 
explaining that he is writing against Filmer because his 
book is 
a Book, which was to provide Chains for all Mankind, I 
should find nothing but a Rope of Sand, useful perhaps 
to such, whose Skill and Business it is to raise a 
Dust, and would blind the People, the better to mislead 
them, but in truth not of any force to draw those into 
Bondage.78 
Although attacked as having "no permanent importance," the 
First Treatise serves as a direct connection between Locke 
77. Knights, 251. 
78. Locke, First Treatise, 1. The number in all 
references to Locke will indicate the paragraph number. 
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and his political philosophy with the time of the exclusion 
crisis.79 While he does not mention parliamentary issues of 
exclusion in his Second Treatise, which Knights claims he 
uses to expand his attack to include writers other than 
Filmer, the major issue of the treatise--man's creation of 
government for the protection of private property--can be 
credited to Filmer.SO If Locke had not refuted Filmer in 
the First Treatise, his attention may not have been directed 
towards property issues. It has even been said that Locke 
held "no sign of interest in the theory of property" 
before writing against his nemesis.81 
Nevertheless, Locke became an innovator in property 
theory. Many of the major interpretations of his work 
devote themselves exclusively to his property theory, 
including those interpretations by c. B. Macpherson and 
James Tully, and no major work on Locke neglects this aspect 
of his thought.82 Although the Second Treatise, and the 
more abstract political philosophy it contains, has 
overshadowed the First Treatise, Locke's writing became 
"intellectually and historically important" because it 
80. Knights, 251. Note, however, in the last chapter 
of the Second Treatise, Locke seems to be most concerned 
with the right of summoning and dissolving Parliament. In 
his "Introduction" to the Two Treatises, Laslett claims that 
this right was an issue between 1678 (or 1675) and 1681 
( 68) • 
81. Laslett, "Introduction," 81. 
82. See my appendix (below) for a discussion of 
different interpretations of Locke's property theory, which 
will be helpful in reading my second and third chapters. 
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started as "a deliberate and polemically effective 
refutation of the writings of Sir Robert Filmer."83 
Like his friend Locke, James Tyrrell also wrote a 
political tract at the time of the exclusion crisis in 
refutation of Filmer. His book, Patriarcha non Monarcha 
(1681), was much more of a dialectic between his own 
arguments and those of Filmer than the Two Treatises. 
Tyrrell felt impelled to refute the divine right of kings 
and Filmer, whom he saw as dangerous because he upheld royal 
absolutism by hereditary right and did not believe in the 
antiquity of the House of Commons. As soon as Tyrrell read 
Filmer's Patriarcha, he felt it was a book which he should 
devote his energies against. As he revealed to his 
antiquarian lawyer friend, William Petyt, 
There is lately come the this town a new treatise 
Sir Robert Filmer's called Patriarcha, which I am 
considering of . . . for the 3rd chapter contains 
dangerous errors.84 
of 
In the preface to Patriarcha non Monarcha, Tyrrell would 
elaborate on why he took the pains to write the book: 
I write these Observations for no other end than for 
the Truth, and in defence of the Government as it is 
establisht, and the just Rights and Liberties of all 
true English-men. All which, I pray God preserve as 
long as the Sun and Moon endure.85 
83. Laslett, 89. 
84. Quoted in J.W. Gough, "James Tyrrell, Whig 
Historian and Friend of John Locke," Historical Journal 19, 
3 (1976): 584. 
85. James Tyrrell, Patriarcha non Monarcha. The 
patriarch unmonarch'd: beinq observations on a late 
treatise and divers other miscellanies, published under the 
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He stated his purpose after declaring that Filmer, among 
others, was "a wooden Idol of their own making."86 When 
Tyrrell states "of their making" he is referring to the 
Tories; he recognizes Filmer as the spokesman for the 
opposition and works to discredit his position. 
As his writing reveals, Tyrrell was a member of the 
Whig party and openly became one after the Glorious 
Revolution. Although his father, Sir Timothy Tyrrell, had 
been a knight in royal service, James devoted himself to 
"attacking the principles for which the royalists had 
stood," though he does provide a defense for the established 
monarchy.87 After marrying into an estate at Oakley in 
1~70, and refusing to practice law, he served as a Justice 
of the Peace and deputy lieutenant for his county of 
Buckinghamshire.88 Tyrrell remained a loyal Whig until his 
death in 1718, when one person remarked that 
"He was a good scholar and well versed in his history, 
but tied to a Party, and writ to serve a turn . He 
had not great judgement, but was to be esteemed for the 
great pains he took."89 
Although this commentator criticized Tyrrell for his 
name of Sir Robert Filmer, baronet. In which the falseness 
of those opinions that would make monarchy jure divino are 
laid open: and the true principles of government and 
property (especially in our kingdom) asserted. By a lover 
of truth and his country (London, England: Printed for 
Richard Janeway, 1681), preface. 
86. Ibid. 
87. Gough, 581. 
88. Ibid., 581-582. 
89. Quoted in Ibid., 605. 
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attachment to the Whig party, this attachment was a bond 
that connects Patriarcha non Monarcha to the political 
circumstances of the exclusion crisis. Writing to "serve a 
turn," Tyrrell's interests in writing his book lay in 
rejecting the Tory position, fronted by Filmer, in order to 
advance the position of the Whigs. He even said as much 
about the two parties when he remarked about groups in 
Britain in 1713, claiming that non-jurors and Whigs were the 
only honest men in the kingdom, while Torys and High-Church 
men "are men of no principles, but go backwards and forwards 
without any regard to conscience."90 Tyrrell championed the 
Whig cause, disliking what he knew of the Tory political 
philosophy. 
Unfortunately for historians of late seventeenth 
century England, little attention has been paid to the 
thought of Tyrrell. There is only one secondary source 
devoted to Tyrrell. Many works about Locke's political 
philosophy refer to his friend. Even J.W. Gough's "James 
Tyrrell, Whig Historian and Friend of John Locke," bears in 
its title a reminder that Tyrrell is famous for his 
relationship with Locke. Gough does write that 
It has been said of James Tyrrell that his "main claim 
to distinction was perhaps his friendship with John 
Locke," but his elaborate monument at Oakley Church 
. • . although it records a number of his qualities and 
achievements, does not mention this.91 
90. Quoted in Ibid., 609. 
91. Gough, 581. 
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Tyrrell, as Gough's statement hints, is worthy of study on 
his own merits. Tyrrell did write another work against the 
Filmerian position in defense of the Whigs in 1694, 
Bibliotecha Politica, which is considerably longer than 
Patriarcha non Monarcha, and has had some recent historical 
attention devoted to it. 
In his "Introduction" to the Two Treatises, Laslett 
recognizes that Tyrrell was more convincing to his 
contemporaries in some ways and, unlike Locke, realized 
"Filmer's needling effectiveness."92 Laslett does not 
expand on these points, though, and does not give an 
indication of where these points can be researched. Despite 
a lack of secondary sources, both Locke and Tyrrell were 
important because of their refutation of Filmer's 
Patriarcha, their reliance on natural law arguments, and 
their inclusion of property in their political philosophy, 
as well as their demonstrated relationship to the Whig-Tory 
debate centering around the exclusion crisis. In the final 
analysis, however, Tyrrell's Patriarcha non Monarcha is the 
most important piece to consider in context of the times in 
which it was written. Tyrrell's work, more than Locke's Two 
Treatises, reflects the political circumstances of the 
exclusion crisis. 
To show the importance of Tyrrell's work it must be 
92. Laslett, "Introduction," 92-3. 
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compared and contrasted with Locke's political philosophy. 
Both men took pains to refute Filmer's patriarchal position 
and, in doing so, adopted property theory which reveals the 
Whig movement from historical arguments to natural law 
arguments. Based on natural law restrictions, both Locke 
and Tyrrell incorporate property theory into their work. 
Relating man's acquisition of private property from common 
property given by God, they both accept the labor theory of 
value and its restrictions. Despite their acceptance of the 
labor theory of value, the definitions of property which 
Locke and Tyrrell accept are drastically different. On the 
one hand, Locke defines property in a way that he attempts 
to for his definition to bridge economic and ideological 
rights. Tyrrell, on the other hand, presents a property 
definition where the term is only employed in reference to 
economic rights and occupancy is accepted as a right to 
property. In addition, while Locke will not accept any 
absolute monarchy as legitimate, Tyrrell presents an 
argument in which absolute monarchy can be considered 
legitimate in some circumstances. Claiming occupancy as a 
right to property, which Locke does not, Tyrrell's possible 
acceptance of absolute monarchy and his purely economic 
definition of property reveals him as a supporter of the 




The Refutation of Filmer: A Turn From Historical 
Arguments to Natural Law Theories 
In writing Patriarcha, Filmer was presenting the 
patriarchal justification of political authority. The work 
was important enough that Locke, Sidney, and Tyrrell 
attacked it, and so, as Gordon Schochet claims, "it is 
necessary to examine patriarchalism on its merits as a 
meaningful justification of political obligation."! In 
seventeenth-century Stuart England, patriarchal theory was 
accepted and pervasive because its appeal to history and the 
Bible was accepted.2 
1. Gordon J. Schochet, Patriarchalism in Political 
Thought: The Authoritarian Family and Political Speculation 
and Attitudes Esoeciallv in Seventeenth-Century England (New 
York: New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1975), 4. 
2. For a revisionist approach, see James Daly's Sir 
Robert Filmer and English Political Thought, where the 
author claims that designating Filmer as a patriarchalist 
can be deceptive because it does not distinguish his 
theories, where the political sovereign is dominant and not 
the family, from anyone else's theories (151-152). In 
addition, patriarchalism "does not really express the 
central characteristic of Filmerism" (151). Daly also 
argues that, despite the merits that patriarchalism was a 
defense of the Stuarts, Filmer himself was nothing but the 
perfect "straw man" for the Whigs (160). He avowed 
principles which the Stuarts feared, but his ideas did not 
move Whig enemies, rather being "an isolated group of 
ideas," which presented his attackers with "all the glory of 
combatting Goliath with none of the dangers David had faced" 
(161, 163). This being said, Daly must be praised for his 
critical and interesting work. Unfortunately, the book 
reads as if Daly set out to argue with any and every 
standard work on the subject. This reading both limits the 
forcefulness of his argument and constantly tells the reader 
to beware that the author may have written to create a 
reputation for himself. An example of an attempt to 
establish a reputation is given when Daly claims that Filmer 
became "something of an intellectual revolutionary" because 
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It seems that there was "no patriarchal theory of 
obligation prior to 1603. 11 3 Appealing to both men who 
lacked education and the gentry, both groups which could 
accept a theory which supported their dominance within their 
own families and followed the great chain of being notion, 
when an absolutist doctrine appeared in Scotland and England 
under James I, patriarchalism could take hold.4 Patriarchal 
political theory 
found a living social reinforcement in the very strong 
position contemporary society afforded to a father 
• • . While patriarchalism was by no means universally 
used or used in the same way when it was, it was able 
to provide material for a wide range of use before 
Filmer published anything on political theory.5 
For patriarchalists of this period, government was not a 
human construct but part of the natural and god-given order. 
According to David Foster, who studies Locke's relationship 
with patriarchal theory, patriarchalists believed government 
did not just preserve property but served to provide a 
"comprehensive paternal care of citizens."6 James t even 
used fatherly analogies to describe his kingly powers.7 
he ignored antiquity and Christian wisdom (154). Although 
Filmer was an important intellectual, even a cursory reading 
of Patriarcha reveals that he relied on both Aristotle and 
the bible for his arguments, in direct conflict with Daly's 
claim. 
3. Schochet, 16. 
4. Ibid., 85-87. 
5. Daly, 59. 
6. David Foster, "Taming the Father: John Locke's 
Critique of Patriarchal Fatherhood," Review of Politics 56, 
4 ( 1994) : 644. 
7. Schochet, 87. 
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During his reign, tracts were published which stressed the 
importance of the Fifth Commandment as a basis for fatherly 
authority and court rulings were given based on the Fifth 
Commandment.a Seventeenth-century England experienced a 
growing acceptance of patriarchal theory as the explanation 
for government's origin. 
When the theory reached Filmer, he came to believe that 
patriarchalism provided the natural basis of order in the 
family and in government, arguing that kingly power and 
fatherly power are one and the same thing. He expresses 
this belief in his writing: "If we compare the natural 
duties of a father with those of a king, we find them to be 
all one, without any difference at all but only in the 
latitude or extent of them. 11 9 Furthermore, Filmer contends, 
"all the duties of a king are summed up in an universal 
fatherly care of his people. 11 10 According to Filmer, the 
king was the father of his subjects; as the father, his 
subjects should be willing to follow his commands and accept 
his government. 
Patriarcha established Filmer as a critic of populism, 
which he felt went against the tying of men to institutions. 
He felt men should be tied to institutions, for tying men to 
institutions was the same thing as admitting "the superior ~ 
8. Ibid., 89-91. 
9. Filmer, 12. 
10. Ibid. 
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powers and rights of fathers" who had established these 
institutions.11 Thus, populism could not be reconciled with 
deriving obligations from the ancestral contracts which 
originally established these institutions. After all, it is 
"unnatural for men to have to choose their governors, or to 
govern or to partake in the government. 11 12 When 
patriarchalism became a political doctrine of serious debate 
during the exclusion crisis, it became so because it was the 
main opposition to populist writers.13 If it were not for 
the Whig-Tory battle during the 1680s, Filmer--as an 
opponent of populism--may never have become well known.14 
Anti-populist, Filmer was against the state of nature, 
contractual government, and the source and character of 
private property away from the king. Because the historical 
accuracy of the Bible was widely accepted in the seventeenth 
century, Filmer was able to employ biblical history from 
Adam to demonstrate a direct line from Adam to monarchs. 
This line of succession allowed for private property, which 
had originally been given from God exclusively to Adam, to 
now be under the sole guidance of the king. Much of 
12. Filmer, 32. 
13. Schochet, 120. 
14. Again, see Daly for a revisionist account. He 
claims that Filmer's now accepted position as a 
representative royalist is a designation his contemporaries 
denied him (159). Rather than English royalism, Daly 
argues, Filmer's ideas were of legal reductionism, but the 
Whig triumph inflated his reputation at a cost of distorting 
his ideas as a royalist. 
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Filmer's originality as a patriarchalist arises from his 
Genesis argument. He makes Genesis "the only source for 
genetic, patriarchal, and any other principles of political 
obligation."15 All of Filmer's theory arises from what he 
thought was God's grant to Adam of absolute power, which has 
descended to contemporary monarchs. He thinks that 
This lordship which Adam by creation had over the whole 
world, and by right descending from him the patriarchs 
did enjoy, was as large and ample as the absolutest 
domain of any monarch which hath been since the 
creation.16 
His reliance on the Genesis argument has been praised as 
making "sovereignty so all-inclusive, so radically simple, 
that problems of definition could hardly appear."17 
Filmer did not accept the contractual theory of 
government. In direct conflict with contractual thinkers, 
Filmer's 
chief point was the moral and logical impossibility of 
deriving government, private property, and the 
hierarchial arrangements that exist in society from the 
conditions of original natural freedom and equality.18 
According to Filmer, if there had truly been natural freedom 
in a state of nature, people would not have progressed 
towards instituting government, but towards anarchy. After 
all, if all men are equal, a contract constructed by one 
generation could not be used to govern the next. Filmer's 
15. Daly, 61. 
16. Filmer, 4. 
17. Daly, 61. 
18. Schochet, 122. 
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patriarchal theory 
opened the prospect of a free-for-all where he himself 
was looking for a practical explanation for the orderly 
construction of new sovereignties consistent with his 
own theories.19 
For order, people needed the obligation to their sovereign, 
the same obligation they owed their father. After all, 
Filmer contends, 
this subjection of children is the only fountain of all 
regal authority, by the ordination of God himself. It 
follows that civil power not only in general is by 
divine institution . . • but power respective in regard 
of the special form of government.20 
In other words, because the people owe their sovereign the 
same obedience they owe their father, as God ordains, order 
can be maintained. 
As a result of his rejection of the idea of contractual 
government, Filmer also denied the possibility that private 
property, outside of the monarch's guidance, exists. Any 
property that exists outside of the monarch only does so 
because of the king's graces. The king holds a "lordship 
. . • over the world" which had descended from Adam and was 
a "large and ample" absolute domain.21 The king could, 
however, grant subjects rights to his property. Otherwise, 
for private property to exist, Filmer reasoned, everyone 
must have come together at some point to agree to its 
institution and he cannot find any instances of people doing 
19. Daly, 86. 
20. Filmer, 7. 
21. Ibid., 4. 
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this. In Patriarcha, he asks his readers for "but one 
example out of the history of the whole world" where 
everyone had come together to make a decision.22 Even if 
everyone had decided to a contract for private property, 
Filmer thought, the contract would not be binding from one 
generation to the next because natural law theorists would 
not accept patriarchalism. 
Instead of contracts instituting government and private 
property, Filmer believed that every government had a 
sovereign whose power was arbitrary and above the power of 
positive law. The sovereign was above positive law because 
kings must stand as judges over laws, which are by nature 
confusing.23 The sovereign's authority was arbitrary 
because making law according to law is both circular and 
originally impossible.24 Arguing against individual 
equality in a state of nature, contractual government, and 
the source and character of private property, Filmer was 
trenchantly anti-populist. 
Filmer's patriarchal theory had an anti-populist nature 
because Filmer used it to link the divine right of kings to 
patriarchal authority and the "direct derivation of all 
political authority from the power of Adam."25 He is the 
only patriarchalist that denies a father's authority changes 
22. Ibid., 6. 
23. Ibid., 47. 
24. Schochet, 132. 
25. Ibid., 139. 
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as his child matures.26 Rather than reason, the final test 
of truth for Filmer was the Bible, which he felt justifies 
only patriarchal monarchy. As he writes in Patriarcha, "God 
• • • [has) taught us by natural instinct, signified to us 
by the creation and confirmed by His own example, the 
excellency of monarchy," for "There is not in all Scripture 
mention and approbation of any other form of government."27 
This was a solid, if not original, justification. Whether 
or not his theory was the standard Tory position at the time 
of the Exclusion crisis, it was the most popular patriarchal 
position and justified anti-populist political beliefs.28 
One of the reasons for the success of Filmer's theory 
is that it gives order to the world which God created. As a 
part of this order, monarchial and fatherly power are 
identical and not merely similar. By equating fatherly and 
monarchial power, Filmer concluded that political power is 
natural, divine, absolute, and unlimited, just as familial 
authority is in its pristine form.29 Filmer tells his 
readers that 
as kingly power is by the law of God, so it hath no 
inferior law to limit it. The father of a family 
governs by no other law than by his own will, not by 
the laws or wills of his sons or servants.30 
As this passage illustrates, the sovereign stands supreme 
26. Foster, 648. 
27. Filmer, 12. 
28. Schochet, 139. 
29. Ibid., 269. 
30. Filmer, 35. 
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within society because, just like a father has no authority 
above him in the family, the king has no power over him in 
the government. 
Contemporary monarchy could be justified by the 
derivation of its power from Adam. This derivation, which 
could secure the fundamentally political interpretation 
of fatherhood and provide a basis on which that 
interpretation could become an explanation for the 
derivation of states, 
leads to an implicit assumption of primogeniture.31 As 
shown through his linking of both the power of fathers and 
kings to primogeniture, Filmer depicts fatherhood as holding 
an abstract and political nature. However, while fatherhood 
is political, he does not discuss the English succession in 
Patriarcha because it was not an issue during his lifetime, 
which became a major political issue of the exclusion 
crisis. 
In ordering the world according to patriarchalism, 
Filmer placed a tremendous importance on property. During 
early and mid-seventeenth century England, Filmer believed 
that property was the main principle of government and 
justice; at the time no one else believed the same thing.32 
By the time of the exclusion crisis, Filmer's belief gained 
wide acceptance, but until then his contemporaries thought 
property indicated belongingness and might apply to 
31. Daly, 74. 
32. See Daly, 158. 
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political rights.33 Englishmen considered property as their 
highest ranking liberty, but Filmer believed that only the 
sovereign (as Adam's descendant) could create property 
rights. 
If only the sovereign could make property rights, then 
sovereignty and liberty are incompatible. Sovereignty and 
liberty would be incompatible because the monarch's subjects 
would not be at liberty to enjoy property rights which were 
not subject to the monarch's power. Filmer believed that he 
could show liberty was a concept which was irrelevant to 
political circumstances. He writes, 
these and many more absurdities are easily removed, if 
on the contrary we maintain the natural and private 
dominion of Adam to be the foundation of all government 
and propriety.34 
Not only was liberty irrelevant, it was not natural. As 
Filmer explains, 
For if the liberty were natural it would give power to 
the multitude to assemble themselves when and where 
they please, to bestow sovereignty and by factions to 
limit and direct the exercise of it.35 
People do not have the right to assemble themselves when and 
where they want, though, because the organization which 
represents them (Parliament) is under the king. Members of 
Parliament "are only members and a part of that body, 
whereof the king is the head and ruler. 11 36 
33. See the discussion of property in the introduction 
(above). 
34. Filmer, 6. 
35. Ibid. I 55. 
36. Ibid., 57. 
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Filmer's reliance on Adam's original and absolute 
proprietary rights led him to a rejection of any notion that 
men once enjoyed goods in common but had grown to the point 
where individuals had acquired private property by natural 
law. Because Adam owned everything, so must every monarch. 
Even the individual's own person is owned so long as the 
monarch has granted it to that individual; the monarch can 
revoke this ownership right at anytime. In writing 
Patriarcha, Filmer reveals the purpose he had in mind when 
writing: 
My task is chiefly to enquire from whom these 
[liberties] first came, not to dispute what of how many 
they are, but whether they are derived from the law of 
natural liberty or from the grace and bounty of 
princes.37 
After telling his readers his purpose for writing, Filmer 
proceeds to explain, 
My desire and hope is that the people of England may 
and do enjoy as ample privileges as any nation under 
heaven. The greatest liberty in the world (if it be 
duly considered) is for people to live under a monarch. 
It is the Magna Carta of this kingdom. All other shows 
or pretexts of liberty are but several degrees of 
slavery, and a liberty only to destroy to them.38 
As this passage reveals, to live under a monarch is to live 
under the monarch's guidance of a person's political rights. 
Unfortunately, because the monarch granted these rights, 
they were subject to his will. Like every other political 
right, even property in one's own person was a "thoroughly 
37. Ibid., 4. 
38. Ibid. 
43 
insecure and retractable emanation of a sovereign will, a 
will which by right could acknowledge no limits 
whatsoever. 11 39 
As well as serving Filmer's argument for absolute 
monarchy, property also serves his argument against 
government by consent. Filmer reasoned that private 
property, like government, could not have been formed by 
consent. If private property had been formed by consent, it 
would mean that at one time every man must have given his 
decision that private property should be instituted. If any 
man later decided that he did not want any other man to 
enjoy private property, every man must lose the right to 
his individual property. Absolute consent is impossible in 
the first place, though. As Filmer asks, 
can they show or prove that ever the whole multitude 
met and divided this power, which God gave them in 
gross, by breaking it into parcels and by appointing a 
distinct power to each several commonwealth?40 
Filmer does not believe that anyone can prove what he asks. 
As a result, there is "neither reason nor proof for so 
thinking" that absolute consent to private property was ever 
given.41 Likewise, Filmer believes, no one can prove that 
absolute consent was ever given to the institution of 
government. If, at any time, there was at least one man who 
wanted government to be eradicated, no man could live in a 
3 9 • Da 1 y , 5 4 • 
40. Filmer, 20. 
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state of political society. 
Filmer's opponents were forced to pay serious attention 
to the relationship between a state's origin and property 
because he used a theory of property, originating from 
Adam's absolute ownership of goods, which demonstrated that 
monarchs had absolute property rights over all of their 
subjects. Although Filmer could explain his patriarchal 
political theory in Patriarcha, it was sufficiently weak on 
a number of points to allow for a successful attack by Locke 
and Tyrrell. "Far more successful in the critical task than 
in setting forth his own theory of politics," Filmer's 
attack against state of nature political theories "was 
unanswerable while simultaneously proclaiming the uniqueness 
and absurdity of his patriarchal doctrine."42 Filmer was 
easily attacked for his own theory through his Genesis 
argument, which is described as "intellectually suicidal."43 
Neither Tyrrell nor Locke agreed with Filmer's 
interpretation of Genesis so that a step-by-step refutation 
of his theory fell into place; if one did not agree with 
Filmer's interpretation of Genesis, the foundation of his 
theory collapses. In addition to his Genesis argument, 
Filmer had a weak point in his reading of the Fifth 
Commandment. According to Filmer, this commandment should 
not include "thy mother," while it should strengthen the 
41. Ibid. 
42. Schochet, 115. 
43. Daly, 156. 
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meaning of "honour" to "obey the sovereign in all things."44 
Filmer states his belief in the importance of the Fifth 
Commandment in Patriarcha: 
To confirm this natural right of regal power, we find 
in the decalogue that the law which enjoins obedience 
to kings is delivered in the terms of 'honour thy 
father' [Exodus, xx, 12] as if all power were 
originally in the father.45 
According to Filmer's patriarchal theory, there is a logical 
connection that extends the Fifth Commandment to reflect the 
power of a king over his subject. Most importantly, 
Filmer's attackers, including Locke and Tyrrell, could agree 
that the state had patriarchal origins, but did not have to 
agree these origins led to inevitable and necessary absolute 
monarchy. 
Locke and Tyrrell both deny Filmer's thesis that Adam 
was originally granted absolute monarchial power by God. 
Instead, they argue, God originally gave the world to 
society in common. For example, Locke writes, in direct 
reference to Filmer, that although Filmer claims "as soon as 
Adam was Created he was de facto Monarch, because by Right 
of Nature it was due to Adam, to be Governor of his 
Posterity," in actuality, 
he could not de facto be by Providence Constituted the 
Governor of the World at a time when there was actually 
no Government, no Subjects to be governed, which our 
A-- here confesses.46 
44. Ibid. I 63. 
45. Filmer, 11-12. 
46. Locke, First Treatise, 16. 
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Locke then proceeds to claim, using "3 Gen. 16," that, even 
if Adam was granted monarchial power, as Filmer claims, it 
could not have been until after the introduction of Eve and 
the Fall.47 By this time, however, Adam was so far removed 
"in condition from his Creation" that it is impossible to 
say "by God's Appointment. as soon as Adam was created he 
was Monarch of the World."48 Locke reason that by Filmer's 
logic, in relation to Adam, that Filmer could be 
an Author before he writ his Book, not in Act •tis 
true, but in Habit, for when he had once Publish'd it, 
it was due to him by the Right of Nature, to be an 
Author.49 
Instead, Locke will argue that the state of nature in 
Genesis is peaceful to deduce that God gave the world to 
society in common.50 
Locke questions how Filmer can use his interpretation 
of Genesis to claim that people owe political obedience to 
their sovereign, because there is no clear indication to 
whom obedience is owed. He refutes an argument for 
primogeniture, implicit in Filmer's theory, explaining, 
47. Ibid. 
48. Ibid. 
49. Ibid., 18. 
50. In the Fifth Chapter of his Second Treatise, "Of 
Property," Locke explains that he "shall endeavour to shew, 
how Men might come to have a property in several parts of 
that which God gave to Mankind in common, and that without 
any express Compact of all the Commoners" (25) . Chapter 2 
(below) explores Locke's state of nature/natural law 
arguments. 
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Adam's Sovereignty, if by vertue of being Proprietor of 
the whole world, he had any Authority over Men, could 
not have been inherited by any of his Children over the 
rest, because they had the same Title to divide the 
Inheritance ..• So neither could Adam's Sovereignty 
by Right of Fatherhood, if any such he had, descend to 
any one of his Children.51 
Even if Locke could accept that Adam had monarchial power, 
he could not accept that any of Adam's descendants are owed 
his obedience, because he denies primogeniture. 
Tyrrell, like Locke, denies that Adam was granted 
original absolute monarchial power and ownership of the 
goods of the earth. Instead, he insists, God gave the world 
to society in common. In Patriarcha non Monarcha, Tyrrell 
writes that "Adams absolute dominion over the lives and 
persons of his Children is not to be deduced from that place 
of Genesis," for dominion was "given unto them both [Adam 
and Eve] joyntly" and "it does not appear that this Dominion 
was personal to Adam and Eve alone. 11 52 All mankind created 
enjoyed the goods of the world God created, for it would not 
be rational or 
consonant to scripture, that God gave Adam such a 
despotick power over all things; for since all the 
Children of Adam had as much right to their lives as 
Adam had himself, it must likewise follow, that they 
had as good a right to the fruits of the earth, which 
were then the only means to maintain it.53 
In addition to denying that God gave Adam ownership 
rights to the earth, neither Tyrrell nor Locke will accept 
51. Locke, First Treatise, 98. 
52. Tyrrell, 101-102, 2nd pagination. 
53. Tyrrell, 102-103, 2nd pagination. 
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Filmer's idea that Adam was ever absolute monarch. By 
disagreeing with Filmer's interpretation of Genesis, Locke 
and Tyrrell destroyed the foundation which Filmer uses to 
construct his patriarchal theory. If Adam was never 
absolute monarch, then there must be some other explanation 
for man's early organization on earth. From this starting 
point, Locke and Tyrrell develop state of nature political 
theories. 
Another sticking point in Filmer's theory is his use of 
the Fifth Commandment. Filmer uses the Fifth Commandment to 
give fathers and kings absolute power (and to receive 
absolute obedience from) their families and subjects. Locke 
particularly attacked Filmer's analysis of the ·commandment. 
While Filmer used the Fifth Commandment to prove that 
fatherly and kingly power are the same, Locke will not 
accept that it has any connection to political power. In 
his First Treatise, Locke lets his readers know that 
Filmer's use of the Fifth Commandment is remarkable. He 
wonders 
how our A. infers from the 5th Commandment, that all 
Power was originally in the Father. How he finds 
Monarchial Power of Government. settled and fixed by 
the Commandment, Honour thy Father and thy Mother.54 
because he does not grant the mother power, although "God 
afterwards all along joyn the Mother with him, to share in 
this Honour."55 Locke is saying that Filmer is contorting 
54. Locke, First Treatise, 62. 
55. Ibid. 
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scripture to suit his purpose. If Filmer's reading of the 
Fifth Commandment can be discredited, then his argument that 
monarchial power is seated in one absolute sovereign, the 
father of his country, can also be discredited. If both 
husband and wife share power over their children, they must 
both be accepted as holding family power and a line cannot 
be drawn from father to king as absolute rulers. While he 
does deny that fathers and kings are absolute rulers, Locke 
does not deny that children should honor their parents; he 
believes children owe "a perpetual obligation of honouring 
their Parents" with "an inward esteem and reverence to be 
shewn by all outward Expressions."56 For Locke, the Fifth 
Commandment links filial obedience with obedience to God, 
understood to be essential for the good order of society.57 
The commandment links obedience to parents with obedience to 
God because it is a bridge between the first four 
commandments (to God) and the last five commandments (to 
other people).58 If a reader accepts Locke's criticism of 
Filmer's reading of the Fifth Commandment, Filmer's 
patriarchal theory is put in jeopardy. If the father has to 
share parental power with his wife, no line of patriarchy 
can be drawn from the father to sovereign. 
Even as a different reading of Genesis and the Fifth 
56. Locke, Second Treatise, 66. 
57. Foster, 665. 
58. Ibid. 
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Commandment can weaken the position Filmer has given to 
fathers and monarchs, Locke and Tyrrell can accept 
patriarchal origins of society without arriving at the same 
conclusions that Filmer reaches. In Locke's Second 
Treatise, Chapter Six is devoted to paternal power. "Of 
Paternal Power" argues that the major problem with 
patriarchalism is its equating of paternal and political 
power. Locke writes, describing the exclusion of 
mothers from power, that patriarchalists are only writing to 
reach the conclusions they want: 
running into those gross mistakes they have made, about 
this Power of Parents: which, however it might, 
without any great harshness, bear the name of Absolute 
Dominion, and Regal Authority, when under the Title of 
Parental Power it seem'd appropriated to the Father 
••• it belong'd to the Mother too; for it will but 
very ill serve the turn of those Men who contend so 
much for the Absolute Power and Authority of the 
Fatherhood • • • would have but ill supported the 
Monarchy they contend for.59 
As this important passage demonstrates, when patriarchalists 
equate paternal power seated in the husband and the king, a 
gross mistake is being made because families arose under a 
joint power of mothers and fathers. Although Locke may be 
going against the practical experience of male-dominated 
Stuart households, where the father has the power, he can 
argue that the father only has power in this case because 
the wife has entrusted her power to him.60 
Society arose from patriarchal origins, but not in the 
59. Locke, Second Treatise, 53. 
60. Ibid., 82-83. 
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manner argued by patriarchalists. For Locke, the family is 
"a profoundly problematic institution that cannot, as the 
patriarchalists contend, supply a foundation or model for 
political order."61 Locke distanced himself from 
patriarchal theory, denying even an analogous relationship 
between organized states and families. David Foster 
maintains the "separation of paternal from political power 
may be fundamental separation of powers in Locke."62 In 
addition, Locke's critique of patriarchalism is "a critical 
reflection on the natural and divine context of human 
life."63 
One's life, Locke argues, is only guided by the parents 
until the child reaches an age of maturity and is only 
guided during this time for preservation, nourishment, and 
education. In the Second Treatise, Locke explains his 
belief that 
the Father's Power of commanding extends no farther 
than the Minority of his Children, and to a degree only 
fit for the Discipline and Government of that Age.64 
As the passage indicates, it must be understood that for 
Locke, paternal power is not natural power. Paternal power 
is more in reference to guardianship that to control or 
ownership: "Only as he is Guardian of his children, that 
when he loses his care of them, he loses his power over 
61. Foster, 662. 
62. Ibid., 643. 
63. Ibid., 643-644. 
64. Locke, Second Treatise, 74. 
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them."65 In a passage described as "one of the most 
dramatic and compelling passages in the Two Treatises," 
Locke elaborates this point.66 Demonstrating that parents 
do not own their children because they begat them, any more 
than monarchs own their subjects, Locke claims that God gave 
people being, not parents. His passage reads: 
They who say the Father gives Life to his Children, are 
so dazzled with the thoughts of Monarchy, that they do 
not, as they ought, remember God, who is the Author and 
Giver of Life: 'Tis in him alone we live. move, and 
have our Being. How can he be thought to give life to 
another, that knows not wherein his own Life 
consists?67 
By arguing that fathers did not own the lives of their 
children, Locke shows by analogy that monarchs do not own 
the lives of their subjects. Not only is human life divine, 
and parental power unnatural, but equating political society 
and families is impossible. According to Locke, it is 
ridiculous for any person to derive political power from a 
fatherly power which is unnatural and inequitable. 
Like Locke, Tyrrell does not accept that families are 
the foundation for government. While believing organized 
states and the family are analogous, a position Daly 
describes as the general royalist and non-Filmerian 
position, he does not need historical connections for 
contemporary government in the way that Filmer does.68 
65. Ibid. , 65. 
66. Foster, 634. 
67. Locke, First Treatise, 52. 
68. Daly, 69. 
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Tyrrell does not need this connection because he relies on 
natural law for his vision of contemporary government, in 
which man has evolved from a state of nature; an evolution 
which does not depend on historical examples.69 In 
contrast, Filmer, who does believe the family and state are 
equal, and not merely analogous, needs historical 
connections for his patriarchal theory (which is where the 
importance of his Genesis argument lays). Against Filmer's 
use of history, in Patriarcha non Monarcha, Tyrrell writes 
I will not deny that the Heads of separate Families, 
being out of Commonwealths, have many things analogous 
to them, though they are not Commonwealths 
themselves.70 
Among the things which Tyrrell mentions as being similar are 
the "power of Life and Death in great Offences, and also of 
making War and Peace."71 In the end, however, "the ends of 
a Family and a Commonwealth are divers: and so many parts of 
a Monarchial Empire are not to be found in Families."72 
Tyrrell also denies Filmer's insistence that the power 
of fathers and, thus, monarchs, is unlimited. For the 
sovereign to be absolute in Filmer's theory, fathers must be 
absolute because their power is the basis for the 
sovereign's power. According to one scholar, "Among the 
most startling of Filmerian contentions was that of the 
69. Chapter Three (below) explores Tyrrell's reliance 
on natural law in his political theory. 




father's right of life and death over his children. 11 73 To 
Tyrrell, though, power is necessarily limited by its ends. 
He explains a son will have grounds to protect himself from 
arbitrary life and death actions of his father: 
So that if a Son have any Right to defend himself in 
what belongs to him from unjust violence of his father, 
he doth not act as his Superior; but in this case as 
his Equal, as his is indeed in all the Rights of 
Nature, considered Equal, as he is indeed in all the 
Rights of Nature, considered only as a Man; Such as 
are a Right to live, and to preserve himself, and to 
use all lawful means for that end.74 
By analogy, Tyrrell provides the argument that if a father 
does not have life and death powers over his children, then 
a king will not have life and death powers over his 
subjects. Using this argument, fatherly and kingly power 
cannot be as absolute as Filmer claims. 
In rejection of Filmer's patriarchal society, "Tyrrell 
put forward a quite different model" where 
the people were not just a mass of theoretically equal 
political units but an organic and articulated whole 
composed of parts which were related to each other 
through different types of subordination sanctioned by 
natural laws of association.75 
Answering patriarchal arguments with natural law arguments, 
Tyrrell was changing the foundation of battle between 
himself and Filmer. In a larger sense, Filmer had changed 
the battle between the Whigs and Tories. 
More realistic than Filmer's society, Tyrrell's model 
73. Daly, 169. 
74. Tyrrell, 26. 
75. Daly, 92. 
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relied on natural law, arising from a peaceful state of 
nature, where property was a major concern. The Whigs were 
moving away from arguments focusing on history to natural 
law arguments and Patriarcha non Monarcha reveals this 
movement by centering around relevant issues of liberty 
associated with the exclusion crisis. By refuting Filmer 
with natural law arguments, Tyrrell should have become a 
major political theorist. Outdistancing Locke in specific 
mention of historical arguments used by Filmer, Tyrrell's 
arguments against patriarchalism probably seemed more vital 
to their contemporaries.76 
Locke's Two Treatises is the supreme example of the 
Whig movement from historical argument to natural law 
argument. In the First Treatise, he explains that past 
behavior is not appropriate for what ought to be. He 
conceded to patriarchalists that 
the natural Father of Families, by an insensible 
change, became the politick Monarchs of them too . • . 
they chanced to live long, and leave able, and worthy 
heirs ••• they laid the foundations of Hereditary, or 
Elective Kingdoms, under several constitutions and 
Manners, according as Chance, Contrivance, or Occasions 
happen'd to mould them.77 
Despite conceding that governments had patriarchal origins, 
Locke would not accept history as a guide to what is 
reasonable. He remarks that 
76. Tyrrell, 226ff. 
77. Locke, First Treatise, 76. 
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if the Example of what hath been done, be the Role of 
what ought to be, History would have furnished our A---
[Filmer] with instances of this Absolute Fatherly Power 
in its heighth and perfection.78 
Locke decided that historical instances can be used to 
provide the opposite. History can provide opposite 
examples, such as Peruvians who had children just "to Fatten 
and Eat them. 11 79 The Peruvians in this supposed historical 
example did not act reasonably. Reason alone, Locke feels, 
should be man's guide. Based on reason, his political 
theory provides a refutation of Filmer's patriarchalism and 
puts the family "on a footing of property affection, and 
anticipated equality between parent and child, rather than 
on mutual duties, fear or reverence, and permanent 
hierarchy. 11 80 
Seemingly, after Locke's Two Treatises were published, 
the issue of patriarchalism as a valid political theory was 
eliminated. Nevertheless, Schochet believes that it was not 
Locke that defeated patriarchalism. Instead, patriarchalism 
was defeated because it became irrelevant as a political 
symbol as the seventeenth century progressed into the 
eighteenth.81 During this time, the rational outlook which 
Locke championed replaced the scriptural authority which 
Filmer believed in. In addition, there was an emphasis 
placed on the distinction between state and society, which 
78. Ibid., 57. 
79. Ibid. 
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Filmer considered as the same through his linking of kings 
and fathers. Because Filmer relied on "a genetic conception 
of history and the denial of the possibility of fundamental 
change," his theory is a show of what would be the "new 
conception of political obligation:" logical and rational 
validity rather than historical and legal validity.82 
As a defense of state of nature theories, and the 
rejection of genetic theories, Locke and Tyrrell agreed that 
no matter what the argument, political absolutism was not 
feasible. In doing so, Locke and Tyrrell revealed that the 
perception of political practice affected its realities.83 
In other words, if people wanted to believe in state of 
nature political theories rather than Filmer's biblical 
patriarchalism, they had every right to believe they were 
responsible for the institution of government. In essence, 
"patriarchal ism would no longer suffice as a theory of 
political obligation because it did not conform to the way 
of viewing the world that Locke himself did so much to 
establish. 11 84 Tyrrell's role is not to be forgotten, 
either, for he may have seen the problems with Filmer's 
patriarchalism even more clearly than Locke. By rejecting 
Filmer's patriarchalism, Locke and Tyrrell turned towards 
political theories which had the state of nature as their 
82. Ibid., 135. 
83. Ibid. I 272. 
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foundation rather than a historical approach to politics. 
Largely because of Filmer's Patriarcha, and other 
royalist works like it, the Whigs adopted a political 
position which stressed that government must be judged by 
how its subjects rights are protected and served, rather 
than by it history. When Filmer gained notice as a 
political theorist, during the exclusion crisis, he 
played a major role in establishing that Tory 
ideology--based almost for the first time on an 
unhesitating assertion of the crown's sovereignty--to 
which the theorists of the opposition had to find an 
answer.85 
Because of Filmer's role, the Whigs had to show that common 
law, the basis for property rights, had existed from the 
beginning of English history or admit that it was created 
by, or originated under, a sovereign.86 For the English 
people, the sovereign would have been the monarch. If 
common law did originate under the king, the king would be 
supreme over the law and absolute in the country. On the 
other hand, if a date or origin for common law could not be 
discovered, personal liberties, such as property, secured 
under that law would be safe and valid. For the Tory party, 
custom, "the historical limitation of right," could not be 
binding unless an authority can make it law, which would 
make the sovereign superior over custom and demonstrate that 
85. J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the 
Feudal Law: A Study of Historical Thought in the 
Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge 
University Press, 1957), 187. 
86. Ibid., 190. 
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every law must have a beginning.87 
Filmer devotes some attention to describing beliefs 
which would later become the crux of Tory beliefs in custom 
and common law in Patriarcha. He describes common law: 
The common law is called unwritten not for that it is 
not written at all, but because it was not written by 
the first devisers or makers of it. The common law 
• is the 'common custom of the realm.'88 
Needing to define custom to develop his definition of common 
law, Filmer writes, 
Custom at first became lawful only by some superior 
power which did either command or consent unto their 
beginning. And, the first power which we find (as is 
confessed by all men) is kingly power, which was both 
in this nation and in all other nations of the world 
long before any laws or any other kind of government 
was thought of .89 
By incorporating definitions of common law and custom in his 
work, Filmer attempts to prove that the king is supreme over 
all law that his opponents feel is the true guide of man. 
According to Filmer, the king is supreme over common law 
because the king made common law lawful. In essence, common 
law owes its existence to the power of the king. 
Party ideas about custom and common law, as expressed 
in Patriarcha, gave the Tories "a vested interest in 
historical research" and the Whigs a vested interest in 
refuting their history. That is, Tories looked to view 
origins, which they rightly suspected to be found in kingly 
87. Ibid., 163. 
88. Filmer, 45. 
89. Ibid. 
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acts, while Whigs hoped to keep constitutional origins 
shrouded in mist. Thus, largely because of Filmer, the 
Tory-Whig debates included a concentration on English 
history. 
J.G.A. Pocock supports the argument that the parties 
focused on history, by admirably demonstrating in The 
Ancient Constitution and Feudal Law, writing "nearly every 
thinker noted for his contribution to political theory . 
devoted part of his pages to discussing the antiquity of the 
constitution. 11 90 However, Pocock claims, Locke is an 
exception because he was "exceptional . . • in omitting any 
discussion of English legal or constitutional history. 11 91 
Richard Ashcraft disagrees. Ashcraft explains his belief 
that Locke's omission of history and the constitution "in 
relation to the political debate of the 1680s" was of "very 
little significance."92 Locke's omission is of little 
importance because the debate was not "structured around a 
historical approach to the political problems of exclusion 
and the limits of political obligation. 11 93 According to 
Ashcraft, "Locke was not an exceptional political writer in 
his rejection of a legalistic approach."94 Although 
Ashcraft's Revolutionary Politics and Locke's "Two 
90. Pocock, 46. 
91. Ibid., 188. 
92. Ashcraft, 189. 
93. Ibid. 
94. Ibid. I 190. 
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Treatises" is an exceptional addition to Lockean 
scholarship, his argument is flawed. Pocock may place too 
much stress on the importance of a Whig-Tory argument of 
historical evolution, but, by not giving it any importance, 
Ashcraft is seriously undermining the range of issues during 
the 1680s.95 
Though history was not the focal point, it was a way 
for the Tories to assert the superiority of their political 
position.96 When Filmer uses patriarchal theory to 
demonstrate a line of succession from Adam to the present 
monarch, he is using history as his guide. Admittedly, 
Filmer weakened his own argument because his "absolutism 
caused him to ignore the complexities of the medieval 
structure and diminished the extent to which his thought was 
genuinely historical," leading him to exclude historical 
evolution.97 On the other hand, both Locke and Tyrrell 
adopted a natural law justification for individual liberties 
because they were led to that position to force a contrast 
with Filmer's insistence on the historical allegiances by 
95. See Knights especially. 
96. By history, I am adopting the definition given by 
The American College Dictionary (New York, New York: Random 
House, 1966): "a continuous, systematic written narrative, 
in order of time, of past events as relating to a particular 
people, country, period, person, etc." (574). This 
definition of history, relating past event that actually 
occurred, often leads to a legal basis for custom and common 
law. I am not referring to history as an assumed evolution, 
which both Locke and Tyrrell accept as an outgrowth of their 
natural law theories. 
97. Pocock, 155. 
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which people owe their loyalty and liberties to the king. 
For those writers that do not believe the king enjoys an 
absolute power over his subjects, he merely remarks that 
"[l]ater writers have taken up too much upon trust."98 
Filmer suggests that writers should "trust experience before 
speculations philosophical."99 
On the other hands, the Whigs present natural law 
arguments. These natural law arguments most strongly reveal 
the radicalism of the Whigs.100 Nevertheless, history is 
still included in the Whig argument because leading 
theorists, including Tyrrell and Petyt, argue that 
Parliament predates the Norman Conquest and trace 
liberties to the Anglo-Saxons.101 In opposition, the Tories 
rejected the theory of the ancient constitution, partly 
because of the Brady Controversy. In the Brady Controversy, 
Dr. Robert Brady showed that Parliament was created by the 
crown in the late-medieval period, which means that 
Parliament is subordinate to its creator, the King. With 
the support of the Brady Controversy, the Tories could adopt 
a position where the use of historical references was their 
way to prove that the king should be absolute. 
Ashcraft misleadingly claims that Filmer said there was 
not any point in appealing to historical law precedents, as 
98. Filmer, 5. 
99. Ibid., 29. 
100. Harris, Politics Under the Later Stuarts, 90. 
101. Ibid., 89. 
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was done in the Brady Controversy, so that Locke and Tyrrell 
"were compelled to counter a natural law argument with one 
of their own in order to defend the 'fundamentals of 
government. 111 102 Although Locke and Tyrrell adopted a 
natural law approach, they did not accept this approach 
because Filmer had already adopted that position. In fact, 
Filmer writes, the populist position is false because "it is 
not to be found in the ancient Fathers and doctors of the 
primitive church. It contradicts the history of the Holy 
Scriptures, the constant practice of all ancient 
monarchies."103 Based on biblical and monarchial history, 
Filmer's political theory could be used to deflate the 
political stance of the Whigs. 
Tyrrell made historical references in Patriarcha non 
Monarcha and found history to be very important. As shown 
by his plans for a three volume History of England 
(1697,1700,1704), he regarded history 
not as a search for answers, perhaps only tentative, to 
questions about the past, but as interpretations, 
either right or wrong, of a definite body of facts, or 
truths, recorded and known.104 
Even Tyrrell's method of writing is important because it 
"reveals his whole conception of the meaning of history."105 
Tyrrell's historical references and method serve as a 
backdrop and a justification for his considerations of 
102. Ashcraft, 189. 
103. Filmer, 3. 
104. Gough, 505. 
105. Ibid. 
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natural law. In Patriarcha non Monarcha he plans to show 
his readers "Since then all the Laws of Nature, or reason, 
are intended for one end or effect, viz., the common good 
and preservation of Mankind" that the history of marriage--
important for refuting Filmer--is a result of natural 
law.106 While Tyrrell incorporates historical references 
into his work, his method of writing serves to make these 
references a backdrop to his natural law arguments. 
Despite his own historical studies, Tyrrell considered 
Petyt his superior in the subject. He asked Petyt to 
provide a discussion of historical interests particular to 
the 1680s, which resulted in The Ancient Constitution of the 
Commons of England Asserted, a book which Tyrrell refers to 
his readers.107 In his book, Petyt argues that parliament 
and the law are immemorial and known to be so in 49 H.3, the 
year the Tories believe is when the Commons started to meet 
regularly.108 While the Tories may have been correct in 
their dating, and the claim that there was a time when the 
King's council met without the Commons, Petyt insists that 
people knew the rights they were entitled to, even though 
they did not practice those rights. In addition, Petyt 
could argue that English history was not continuous (because 
William ruled as a conqueror) so that any claim to dating is 
106. Tyrrell, 15. 
107. Pocock, 188. 
108. Ibid., 191. 
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nothing but a broken record. 
Although historical references were not important to 
his political theory, which was presented in the abstract, 
Locke was willing to explain nature by looking into the 
past, though not accepting historical examples as producing 
values. As Gordon Schochet explains, for Locke, "origins 
• • . led to government in a prudential rather than 
necessary sense," meaning that historical references were 
fine as long as they did not overstep their purpose and 
become absolute.109 Locke writes in the Second Treatise 
that even though "Contenders for Paternal Empire" may be 
granted that governments may have originally been founded on 
paternal rights, 
they would do well not to search too much into the 
Original of Governments, as they have begun de facto, 
lest they should find at the foundation of most of 
them, something very little favourable to the design 
they promote, and such a power as they contend for.110 
The problem Locke foresees is "Reason being plain on our 
side, that Men are naturally free. 11 111 In other words, no 
matter what historical references the Tories can find to 
argue that the king should be absolute, reason will always 
prevail in showing that history should not be man's 
political guide. 
Because the Whigs would lose a historical debate with 
109. Schochet, 260. 
110. Locke, Second Treatise, 103. 
111. Ibid. 
66 
the Tories they owe their focus on a natural law argument to 
their opposition.112 The fact that Locke makes only one 
reference to constitutional and legal history in the Second 
Treatise, where he merely refers his readers to other works 
on the subject, reveals his indifference to historical 
fact.113 He was an exceptional Whig in this respect. It 
may have been because Petyt shifted his argument from Filmer 
to immemorial common law that Locke shifted the debate away 
from history.114 Whatever the reason, Locke "understood 
that the security of political liberty in the seventeenth 
century did not really depend on the interpretation of what 
happened in the eleventh. 11 115 Perhaps as a response to 
Petyt, and certainly as a contrast to Filmer, Locke did not 
appeal to history. 
Without an appeal to history, no new findings could 
prove Locke incorrect. Locke's Two Treatises were 
at once a response to a particular political 
situation and a statement of universal principle, made 
as such and still read as such . . . [making) the 
discussion of politics so completely independent of 
historical example, so entirely autonomous an area of 
discourse.116 
Locke, the supreme example of a Whig political theorist 
resting on an argument of natural law, reveals his party's 
112. The Whigs did not just concede the Tories their 
historical argument, although this is what Ashcraft claims 
in his Revolutionary Politics (214). 
113. Pocok, 239. 
114. Ibid., 237. 
115. Gough, 588. 
116. Laslett, "Introduction," 91. 
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movement as a contrast to Tory historical arguments. 
In their refutation of Filmer, there were some issues 
that Locke and Tyrrell attempted to demolish and other 
issues that they attempted to avoid. In attempting to 
demolish Filmer's patriarchal theory, Locke and Tyrrell 
revealed that if a reader did not agree with Filmer's 
interpretation of Genesis or of the Fifth Commandment, a lot 
of his theory fell apart. Genesis and the Fifth Commandment 
served as a foundation for Filmer's insistence that the king 
was both absolute and a father to his subjects; if Filmer's 
interpretations were rejected, then the foundation of his 
theory was pushed over. In addition, Locke and Tyrrell were 
able to show that the acceptance of patriarchal 
origins of society did not have to lead to inevitable 
absolute monarchy. While accepting patriarchal origins, 
Locke does not even consider society and the family to be 
analogous and Tyrrell will only accept that they are 
analogous to some extent; neither man will accept that 
society and the family are the same. While attempting to 
demolish Filmer's interpretations of Genesis and the Fifth 
Commandment, as well as the outcome of patriarchal origins 
of society, Locke and Tyrrell attempted to avoid historical 
arguments. Both men did agree that history was an important 
area of study, but Tyrrell relied on historical examples 
only to a limited degree and Locke omitted mention of 
history altogether. For both men, history was a supplement 
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John Locke's Political Theory: Natural Law and Property 
Locke helped to establish the law of nature as a 
binding law within political society during the seventeenth 
century because of Whig problems with historical arguments 
arising from the Exclusion Crisis. Described as "the law of 
God in fact and knowledge," natural law led seventeenth 
century political theorists, including Locke, to believe 
that man acted morally because he understood that to do so 
would be to follow God's law.1 Natural law entitles man to 
the natural right of self-preservation and to the duty to 
fulfill this right.2 It was Locke's nemesis, Filmer, who 
directed Locke towards an argument based on natural law 
which men must obey. According to James Tully, author of A 
Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries, in 
Locke's political theory, 
the presence and widespread awareness of Filmer's 
critique renders a consistent natural law theory of 
property a necessary precondition.3 
By moving towards an argument based on natural law, Locke 
responded to Filmer's patriarchal arguments without having 
to respond to his historical arguments. 
Locke believed the law of nature is most fully realized 
in a state of nature. This state is "the condition in which 
1. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 
Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), 203. 
2. James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke 
and His Adversaries (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980), 62-63. 
3. Ibid., 54-55. 
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the executive power of the law of nature remains exclusively 
in the hands of individuals and has not been made 
communal."4 It is "a State of perfect Freedom . 
without • . . depending upon the Will of any other man" and 
"a State also of Equality, wherein all the power and 
Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than 
another."5 In his state of nature, natural law was binding, 
but unwritten, so that no man was a competent judge of what 
actions taken by another man are right or wrong.6 
Even without an established judge, in the state of 
nature all men are free and equal and live together 
peacefully. As W. Von Leyden argues, the law of nature sets 
bounds within this state as to what each man is allowed to 
appropriate and keep.7 These bounds keep man within his own 
circle of interests, without conflict between him and 
others. Furthermore, because all men are willing to act 
morally, according to God's law, there will not be any 
conflict over what each man will appropriate. A way to 
avoid conflict in appropriation is the limitation that each 
man must leave enough goods so that other men will be able 
to appropriate enough to survive. If each man is able to 
collect enough goods for his own needs, there is no reason 
4. Laslett, "Introduction," 111. 
5. Locke, Second Treatise, 4. 
6. Ibid. I 136. 
7. W. Von Leyden, "John Locke and Natural Law," Life, 
Liberty, and Property: Essays on Locke's Political Ideas, 
ed. Gordon J. Schochet (Belmont, California: Wadsworth 
Publishing Company, 1971), 15. 
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men cannot live together peacefully in a state of nature. 
Despite the peacefulness of the state of nature, the 
continued appropriation of goods provides a reason for man 
to move towards the formation of political society. 
According to Locke, when man eventually and inevitably makes 
his move from a state of nature into political society, he 
does so for the preservation of his personal property. 
Despite this move, the obligations of natural law remain in 
political society, providing the justification for municipal 
laws.a Natural law is important in Locke's political theory 
because it remains during and after man's movement from a 
state of nature to a state of political society, remaining 
the overriding force of man's motivation in both states. As 
Leo Strauss explains, "Locke's political teaching stands or 
falls by his natural law teaching concerning the beginning 
of political society."9 In fact, Locke's entire "political 
teaching" rests on his assumptions about a state of nature. 
Locke's faith in a state of nature is open to attack. 
For example, George Sabine criticizes the state of nature as 
a fiction which must be laid aside to see the real meaning 
of Locke's work, which is that moral rules are broader than 
positive laws and that morality makes law, rather than law 
8. Ibid., 15. 
9. Strauss, 215. 
72 
making morality.IO Sabine implies that Locke uses a 
construct which is not real to base the rights of man upon. 
If a state of nature never existed, there is no actual 
justification for man's rights, including the right to 
private property, which is Locke's model for all other 
natural rights, including consent, freedom, and reason. In 
truth, Locke's concept of natural law is an assertion that 
man, above all, should act morally in political society. 
Despite Sabine's criticism, it is imperative to treat the 
state of nature during a reading of the Second Treatise, as 
a valid theoretical construct, even if fictious, of early 
man because Locke used it for that purpose; he was able to 
use the state of nature for the basis of the law of nature. 
He does not argue that morality makes law, in spite of 
Sabine's interpretation. The state of nature is Locke's 
basis for man's appropriation of private property, as well 
as his other rights, and his evolution towards political 
society. 
Other criticisms of Locke are fair. For instance, one 
commentator writes that, according to Locke, natural law was 
at one and the same time a command of God, a rule of 
reason, and a law in the very nature of things as they 
are, by which they work and we work too, 
but must admit that Locke never analyzes natural law as a 
term.11 In his clearest definition of natural law, Locke 
10. Sabine, 526. 
11. Laslett, "Introduction," 95, 97. 
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merely claims that it is "Reason, which is that Law. 11 12 
Reason, he continues, serves as a teacher to "All Mankind, 
who will but consult it, that being all equal and 
independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, 
Health, Liberty, or Possessions."13 Particularly 
unrevealing, Locke's definitions of reason and natural law 
are not expanded on more than these two quotes. In fact, 
although most Lockean scholars admit that "the notion of 
natural law can be seen to be of central importance in his 
treatise on Civil Goverment," they also accept that Locke 
never tries to give an elaborate description to the concepts 
of reason, the state of nature, and natural law.14 
Perhaps Locke never elaborates on natural law because 
he realizes that it was in conflict with theology. In the 
Second Treatise, Locke expresses this realization when he 
writes, 
But though this be a State of Liberty, yet it is not a 
State of Licence, though Man is in that State have an 
uncontrollable liberty, to dispose of his Person or 
Possessions, yet he has not Liberty to destroy 
himself.15 
In other words, man's natural right to himself as property 
cannot conflict with the moral obedience he owes to God not 
to destroy himself. Locke reveals the conflict between 
natural law and theology in another instance, writing that 
12. Locke, Second Treatise, 6. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Von Leyden, 12. 
15. Locke, Second Treatise, 6. 
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man must choose between 
Whether we consider natural Reason, which tells us that 
Men, being once born, have a right to their 
Preservation • • • Or Revelation, which gives us an 
account of those Grants God made of the World to Adam, 
and to Noah, and his Sons.16 
As this passage suggests, Locke believes there is a clear 
distinction between what Reason tells man and what 
Revelation reveals to man. 
Although Locke's state of nature has been criticized as 
nothing but a state of fiction, he blends his ideas of 
natural law with the growing late-seventeenth century 
concept of property as a justification of personal 
liberties. Through this blend, Locke is able to develop a 
radical theory of property. While his work helped to 
develop the contours of the late seventeenth century concept 
of property as a preservation of political liberties with a 
foundation in natural law, Locke was able to explain how man 
in the state of nature moved towards political society for 
the preservation of personal property. In a sense, private 
property is an extension of natural law. While natural law 
provides man freedom for what is another's, it does not 
define what belongs to other men. Private property, as an 
extension of natural law, does explain what is another•s.17 
In addition, because Locke did not present an historical 
argument, for his political theory "to appear at all 
16. Ibid., 25. 
17. Tully, 83. 
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plausible to his immediate audience, he had to show that 
property, and equality, could be explained in a way 
consistent with natural law."18 Locke had to show that his 
theory was consistent with natural law because he rejected 
historical arguments, which was the accepted method for 
developing a political theory. 
Although Locke's property definition is not specific, 
there is a dual conception within his definition: both 
material goods and ideal benefits, "Lives, Liberties, and 
Estates, which I call by the general Name, Property."19 The 
ideal benefits of this definition relate to the lives and 
liberties of man, suggesting that property is more than just 
tangible goods, but part of a person's being. On the other 
hand, material goods are also a component of Locke's 
definition, the estates, suggesting that property is also 
composed of tangible products, such as land. 
Locke's dual conception of property reflects the 
seventeenth century trend of moving towards definitions of 
property which bridge the ideological {lives and liberties) 
and the economic {estates). Attempting to put Locke's 
definition into historical perspective, Sibyl Schwarzenbach 
argues that it arose from the controversy surrounding the 
Exclusion Crisis because Locke needed a way to justify 
legitimate political authority and "justification for the 
18. Ibid., 54-55. 
19. Locke, Second Treatise, 123. 
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rights and property of individuals prior to and independent 
of government. 11 20 According to this argument, Locke wrote 
his property theory as a defense of individual rights and 
goods arising out of the constructs of political society. 
Moving away from historical arguments, his focus was shifted 
to defending property through natural law. 
Locke's political theory was radical. He implies that 
man, though living in peace within the state of nature, 
created political society for the preservation and 
protection of private property. Private property, which 
originated in the state of nature, antedates the creation of 
government. As Locke writes, 
I shall endeavour to shew, how Men might come to have a 
property in several parts of that which God gave to 
Mankind in common, and that without any express Compact 
of all the Commoners.21 
By arguing that private property antedates civil society 
Locke is claiming that property is independent of, and not 
created by, society because private property antedates civil 
society. Chapter Five of the Second Treatise explains this 
claim. 
Chapter Five of the Second Treatise also provides 
Locke's belief in the labor theory of property. The labor 
theory of property states that people appropriate private 
property by joining their labor with goods or an object. 
20. Sibyl Schwarzenbach, "Locke's Two Conceptions of 
Property," Social Theory and Practice 14, 2 (1988): 142. 
21. Locke, Second Treatise, 25. 
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This theory is considered among "the most influential 
statements he ever made."22 Locke's labor theory of 
property is: 
Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature 
hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour 
with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and 
thereby makes it his Property.23 
Man's labor puts a value on property. By joining his labor 
with an object, man gives that object value. In Locke's 
words, "'tis Labour indeed that puts the difference of value 
on every thing."24 The labor theory of value was 
revolutionary because it means that man's own effort, his 
labor, is responsible for what he has that is valuable.25 
The theory of property found in "Of Property" was radical 
because it argued that property antedates the formation of 
government, which is established to preserve it, and is 
given value when man mixes his labor with goods or an 
object. Before Locke, few political theorists had given any 
prominence to property in considerations of political 
origins.26 
The state of nature is essential to Locke's theory of 
property for it is in that state where man begins to 
appropriate private property. For Locke, the state of 
nature was not just a "hypothetical assumption," but an 
22. Laslett, "Introduction," 114. 
23. Locke, Second Treatise, 27. 
24. Ibid. I 40. 
25. Strauss, 248. 
26. Laslett, "Introduction," 114. 
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actual early state of people. Locke devoted the entire 
second chapter of the Second Treatise to "Of the State of 
Nature." Quite simply, the state of nature was 
a state without government where the laws of nature conduct 
a person's actions. Although Locke did not recognize any 
law of nature "in the proper sense of the term," he conceded 
that nature set limits on what man may appropriate.27 
Natural law in a state of nature and with regard to property 
is directed towards preventing waste, with each man 
appropriating what he can for his immediate needs.28 
There is no real demonstration of proof within the 
Second Treatise that preservation of waste is what actually 
occurs in a state of nature, but Locke proceeds in a step-
by-step description to explain how man moves from this state 
towards political society. Because of Locke's method, he 
has been attacked as holding a "sentimental trust in nature" 
which had "no logical ground" other than the "vague 
assumption" that harmony would be found in nature.29 On the 
other hand, because Locke did give man's step-by-step 
movement from a state of nature to political society, 
following the law of nature, one commentator praises him for 
raising the study of natural law to a demonstrative 
science.JO Most scholars accept that Locke equated lawful 
27. Strauss, 220. 
28. Ibid., 237. 
29. Sabine, 529. 
30. Strauss, 202. 
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property rights with natural property rights, as a link 
between natural and political societies.31 In Locke's 
opinion, morality as the outcome of natural law is not 
distinct from what is legally actionable; the law of nature 
is a law. Natural law remains the foundation of both the 
state of nature and political society, despite man's shift 
in organization. Property is vital to this shift. 
Laslett states, 
it is through the theory of property that men can . 
proceed from the abstract world of liberty and equality 
based on their relationship with God and natural law, 
to the concrete world of political liberty guaranteed 
by political arrangements.32 
Man's appropriation of property is the bridge between a 
state of nature and political society, both states ruled by 
natural law, explained step-by-step by Locke in the Second 
Treatise. 
It is important to understand Locke's step-by-step 
explanation of man's movement from a state of nature to a 
state of political society because that movement is the 
central focus of his Second Treatise. Robert A. Goldwin 
provides an insight as to why Locke proceeds in this way by 
stating "the central theme of Locke's whole political 
teaching: [is] increase."33 By proceeding from a state of 
31. For example, see Sabine (536-537) and Strauss 
( 202) . 
32. Laslett, "Introduction," 117. 
33. Robert A. Goldwin, "John Locke, 1632-1704," Historv 
of Political Philosophy, ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey 
(Chicago, Illinois: Rand McNally and Company, 1963), 250. 
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nature where the major limitation of private property and 
accumulation is the spoiling of products, to possessing 
money in a state of nature to by used for the enlargement of 
possessions beyond immediate needs, to the creation of 
goverment for the protection of private property, Locke's 
political man is moving from a state of penury to a state of 
plenty. Thus, Locke provides a detailed analysis of man's 
evolution from a state of nature to a state of political 
society. 
In the beginning of man's social evolution, no one 
owned anything other than that each man owned himself. 
According to Locke, 
Though the Earth, an all inferior Creatures by common 
to all Men, yet every man has a Property in his own 
Person. This no Body has any right to but himself .34 
All other property is derivative from the condition that man 
has property in himself. By adding his labour to other 
goods, man makes those goods his own.35 The only limitation 
on man's creating his own goods are that he must leave 
enough for others' needs, taking only what he can use before 
it spoils. Locke presents the spoilage limitation as 
follows: 
As much as any 
life before it 
a Property in. 
his share, and 
one can make use of to any advantage of 
spoils; so much he may by his labour fix 
Whatever is beyond this, is more than 
belongs to others.36 
34. Locke, Second Treatise, 27. 
35. Ibid. 
36. Ibid., 31. 
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Land, in addition to other goods, can be gained as private 
property by joining it with labor. As Locke contends, 
I think it is plain, that Property in that too [land] 
is acquired as the former. As much land as a Man 
Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates, and can use the 
Product of, so much is his Property. He by his labour 
does, as it were, inclose it from the common.37 
Man's labor gives him title to the land and other goods 
because it instills those things with value. Value or price 
is determined by "quantity or vent," similar to supply and 
demand.38 Because man produces a quantity of goods through 
his labor, the goods are given value because they have been 
appropriated. Likewise, because land has been made 
productive by man's labor it has been given value. At 
first, appropriated goods and productive land will be scarce 
so that they are valuable. By the time that there are 
appropriated goods and productive land, it is obvious that 
private property has come into existence, arising from man's 
property in himself. 
Locke has been attacked for accepting spoiling as a 
limitation of man's appropriation of property.39 Indeed, 
there does not seem to be a reason why any type of 
limitation would be needed in the overabundance found in a 
state of nature. However, if there was a scarcity of 
possible property, labor cannot establish a title to 
37. Ibid., 32. 
38. Goldwin, 445. 
39. Ibid., 447. 
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property because everyone would be competing for something 
that could not go around. Goods and land were not scarce, 
so that waste was inevitable. The waste found in a state of 
nature is worth nothing. For instance, 
Land that is left wholly to Nature, that hath no 
improvement of Pasturage, Tillage, or Planting, is 
called, as indeed it is, wast; and we shall find the 
benefit of it amount to little more than nothing.40 
By accepting waste within the state of nature, Locke 
provides a way to justify his property theory as a 
liberation for man from this waste; from a state of nature. 
When man finally began to cultivate land and produce 
more than just what his family needed, money was invented 
for incentive. Locke writes, 
And thus came in the use of Money, some lasting thing 
that Men might keep without spoiling, and that by 
mutual consent Men would take in exchange for the truly 
useful, but perishable supports of Life.41 
With the invention of money, "men solved the basic economic 
problems of the state of nature."42 Although the state of 
nature experienced an overabundance of goods, money 
eliminated this to some degree because it allowed men to 
accumulate more goods than they immediately needed. 
Furthermore, Locke was able to justify inequality in 
property among men because labor produced more money. The 
more someone worked, the more property they would 
40. Locke, Second Treatise, 42. 
41. Ibid., 47. 
42. Goldwin, 449. 
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accumulate, and, thus, the more money they would earn by 
selling their excess property. By agreeing to make gold and 
silver valuable (money), men promoted inequality within the 
state of nature: 
Men have agreed to disproportionate and unequal 
Possession of the Earth . • . by receiving in exchange 
for the overplus, Gold and Silver • • • This partage of 
things, in an inequality of private possessions, men 
have made practicable out of the bounds of Societie 
••• by putting a value on gold and silver.43 
Thus, cultivation of land and money were combined in the 
evolution of Locke's political man. 
Locke placed great importance on the combination of 
labor of land and money. This combination makes increase 
possible, which Goldwin accepts as the "central theme of 
Locke's political theory." Without man's cultivation of the 
land combined with money, nature would not be able to 
provide the conditions in which the increase of mankind 
would be fulfilled.44 Farmers increase what is available to 
other men by producing crops through the cultivation of 
land. In order to protect the private property of 
individuals, now able to accumulate more than their 
immediate needs, men institute government. 
Government, considered the "final step in the long 
process of the liberation of man's powers of increase from 
the restraints of nature," provides three things necessary 
43. Locke, Second Treatise, 50. 
44. Goldwin, 451. 
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to preserve property: an established law, a judge to 
determine differences according to the law, and the power to 
support and execute the decisions of a judge.45 The 
established law will be accepted as "allowed by common 
interest to be the Standard of Right and Wrong, and the 
common measure to decide all controversies between them. 11 46 
The judge will reverse the possibility within the state of 
nature that "Men being partial to themselves, Passion and 
Revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much 
hear, in their own Cases ••• to make them too remiss."47 
once men enter into political society, they consent that 
government will have the power to enforce the rulings of the 
judges. Locke explains man's consent: 
For being now in a new State, wherein he is to enjoy 
many Conveniences, from the labour, assistance, and 
society of others in the same Community, as well as 
protection from its whole strength; he is to part also 
with as much of his natural liberty in providing for 
himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the 
Society shall require; which is not only necessary, but 
just; since the other members of the society do the 
like.48 
These three things are accepted by all men who agree to make 
a compact to enter into political society in order to better 
"preserve himself his Liberty and Property. 11 49 
When the compact is made, and government created, a 
distinct break from the state of nature is established. Men 
46. Locke, Second Treatise, 124. 
47. Ibid. I 125. 
48. Ibid. I 130. 
49. Ibid. I 131. 
85 
enter into civil or political society when the break is 
made. For Locke, political society occurs 
Wherever therefore any number of Men are so united into 
one Society, as to quit every one his Executive Power 
of the Law of Nature, and to resign it to the publick 
• • • he authorizes the Society . . . the Legislative 
thereof to make Laws for him . . • the Execution 
whereof, his own assistance.SO 
When men have reached the point in the state of nature where 
they can accumulate more property than fulfills their 
immediate needs, through the use of money, government is 
created and instituted. Established for the protection of 
private property, government includes an established and 
accepted law, a judge to decide cases concerning the law, 
and the power to enforce the decisions of the judge. 
By putting Locke's property theory into the language of 
contemporaries and ascertaining the intentions of past 
authors, Locke's property theory is given a foundation.51 
Locke's theory arises from his belief in natural law and a 
state of nature and the seventeenth century movement of the 
concept of property towards the justification of personal 
liberties. Because property is the motivating factor in 
Locke's movement from a state of nature to a state of 
political society, it is a defining feature of man. In 
fact, property "seems to give the political quality to 
personality."52 While man can separate himself from his 
50. Ibid., 89. 
51. This method is supported by Sampson. 
52. Laslett, "Introduction," 116. 
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property, he assocrates his freedom, equality, power to 
execute the law of nature, and consent to negotiations with 
other men to his personal goods.53 As a result, man can 
alienate his personal property which he associates with 
natural rights although he cannot alienate himself. When 
man alienates his personal property by consenting to a 
government which will limit some of his natural 




Tyrrell and Locke as Natural Law Theorists: 
Similarities and Differences 
Writing at almost the same time as Locke (and about the 
same issues of property) James Tyrrell expounded his ideas 
in Patriarcha non Monarcha. Tyrrell's work is similar to 
Locke's because he wrote it to refute Filmer, incorporated 
ideas of natural law, and based it around the origins and 
institution of private property. Patriarcha non Monarcha 
was a significant political work of the exclusion crisis. 
Although he does not mention his name, Locke refers to 
Tyrrell in his First Treatise by writing of "the Ingenious 
and Learned Author of Patriarcha non Monarcha."1 Locke 
makes this reference after stating that ideas of succession 
and primogeniture in relation to property need not be 
detailed because they had been "fully related" in Tyrrell's 
book. Laslett explains that even though the above is the 
only direct reference to Tyrrell made by Locke, "the 
parallel passages between it and Locke's noted in this 
edition show how close the two men were."2 
David Wootton places a great deal of emphasis on his 
conviction that Locke wrote with Tyrrell in mind. He 
explains it is a "fact that every single one of the central 
themes of the Second Treatise would arise naturally out of a 
1. Locke, First Treatise, 124. 
2. Laslett, "Introduction," 70. 
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consideration of Tyrrell's Patriarcha non Monarcha. 11 3 
Basing his argument on the idea that Locke "almost 
certainly" wrote the Second Treatise after Patriarcha non 
Monarcha was published in 1681, and that there is no 
evidence that Locke influenced Tyrrell's work, Wootton 
claims that "almost all the principles that we think of as 
being distinctly Lockean are in fact borrowed by Locke from 
Tyrrell."4 Partly based on his date for the authorship of 
the Second Treatise, Wootton presents the most forceful 
secondary argument for a direct connection between Locke and 
Tyrrell. 
Laslett, who first dated the Two Treatises as an 
exclusion tract, written long before the Revolution which it 
was assumed to justify, Laslett disagrees with Wootton's 
dating of Locke's work. According to Laslett, Tyrrell and 
Locke wrote their works at the same time: "Exactly the same 
decision was taken at exactly the same time, with very 
similar results on his final text in refutation of Filmer, 
by his friend James Tyrrell."5 Following this argument, 
Locke and Tyrrell wrote independently of each other with 
similar results concerning natural law and property theory. 
Even though Laslett argues for the independence of the two 
men, he gives credit to Tyrrell for being the innovator of 
3. David Wootton, "Introduction," Political Writings of 
John Locke (New York, New York: Penguin Group, 1993), 77. 
4. Ibid., 83. 
5. Laslett, "Introduction," 73. 
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the labor theory of value.6 Tyrrell's claim for originating 
this theory, which helps to explain Lockean man's transition 
from a state of common property to private property, must be 
considered when anybody argues for any originality in the 
Two Treatises. Even if Patriarcha non Monarcha did not 
predate the Two Treatises, any claim to originality which 
Locke's work provokes must take into consideration the very 
similar dating and ideas presented by Tyrrell. Even if 
Patriarcha non Monarcha did not influence the political 
theory found in the Two Treatises, both Locke and Tyrrell 
were natural-law theorists who argued that men were born 
with a right to their freedom, that the state of nature was 
peaceful, that property is a major reason for man's 
evolution towards political society, and governmental powers 
are granted by individuals. 
Tyrrell and Locke both incorporated into their 
arguments that men were born with a right to their freedom. 
For Locke, this argument was the basis for his entire 
conception of the state of nature. In this state, men 
enjoyed stewardship of their natural rights, given by God. 
Tyrrell also advances the idea that men are born with and 
retain a right to individual freedom. He explains, 
5. Laslett, "Introduction," 73. 
6. Ibid. , 7 4. 
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If they do not like the Government they live under, the 
world is wide enough, and they may remove themselves 
elsewhere: for I cannot think that the positive Laws of 
any Government do oblige any man in Conscience . . • 
And if one man may do this, why not more, and so on to 
an indefinite number?7 
Tyrrell argues that all men are entitled to change the 
conditions under which they live, as dictated by their 
consciences. Men should not defer from their consciences 
past the point where they are "convinced the thing commanded 
is more than indifferent in its own nature, and conduces to 
the good of Mankind in general, or of the whole Commonwealth 
in particular."8 In other words, if a man is commanded to 
extremes of action (such as taking another man's life by 
order of his sovereign) the right to his freedom entitles 
him to disregard this order if it is not beneficial to his 
fellow men or to his country. Whether presented from a 
state of nature viewpoint (Locke) or a viewpoint that 
accepts existing conditions (Tyrrell), both men argued that 
men were born with the right to their freedom. 
Unlike Locke, Tyrrell depends upon historical 
references for examples of the argument that men are born 
naturally free. Tyrrell refers to the historical example 
that 
7. Tyrrell, 87. 
8. Ibid. 
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this notion of a native Allegiance (was not] known to 
our Saxon Ancestors, since they counted no man an 
absolute subject until he was sworn in the Tourn or 
Court of Frankpledge, and was entered into a decanary 
or Tything.9 
According to Tyrrell, man is guided by his personal freedom 
until the institution of government, after which he consents 
to accept the government's authority. However, even after 
man temporarily forfeits his freedom to the authority of the 
government, he can retain that freedom by moving to another 
country to change unsuitable living conditions imposed by 
the government. 
Tyrrell pushes his belief that men are born with the 
right to freedom to its natural conclusion. He accepts the 
premiss that men only need obey their patriarchs until the 
age of nonage (twenty-five years old) when they will be able 
to take care of themselves. Upon the acceptance of this 
premiss, Tyrrell declares 
that those that first instituted Government in any 
Country, have no necessity expressly to promise or 
engage for the Subjection and Obedience of their 
Children, or those who should succeed them.10 
Even though men have a natural right to their freedom, once 
people enter into society they should follow the contracts 
of their ancestors and not destroy or alter their government 
without very good cause.11 In the final analysis, Tyrrell 
believes, no man is "obliged to the Acts or Agreements of 
9. Ibid., 87-88. 
10. Ibid., 77. 
11. Ibid. 
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their Ancestors in the state of Nature farther than it 
conduces to their benefit or preservation."12 
Tyrrell accepts that all men are born with a natural 
right to their freedom, start to enjoy this freedom when 
they reach nonage, and cannot lose this right. According to 
Wootton, Tyrrell was the first natural law theorist to argue 
for all of these conditions. Locke agrees with Tyrrell in 
all of these respects: 
A man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to 
the Arbitrary Power of another; and having in the State 
of Nature no Arbitrary Power over the Life, Liberty, or 
Possession of another, but only so much as the Law of 
Nature gave him for the preservation of himself, and 
the rest of Mankind; this is all he doth, or can give 
up to the Common-wealth.13 
This passage reveals Locke's belief that man cannot lose his 
right to freedom once given by nature to government. Man 
cannot lose his natural freedom to government because he can 
only consent to a government that does not enroach upon his 
right to self-preservation. 
As late seventeenth century natural law theorists, 
Locke and Tyrrell also believed that men were born into a 
state of nature which was essentially peaceful. That it was 
peaceful is shown by man's ability to "establish and 
identify private property rights."14 As Locke shows, 
individual men can appropriate private property from 
12. Ibid., 75. 
13. Locke, Second Treatise, 135. 
14. Wootton, 81. 
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property given in common by God through the addition of 
their labor. Tyrrell's Patriarcha non Monarcha reveals the 
same labor theory of value. Accompanying the labor theory 
of value in each man's political theory are the natural law 
limitations of need and spoilage on appropriation. 
Property was originally given by God in common to all 
of mankind. Man then appropriated this common property into 
private property because of their interest in self-
preservation. As Tyrrell explains, "all things being 
exposed to all men . . . they did not belong to this person 
more than to another."15 Men were able to use property for 
their needs. However, man's use of property was limited by 
what Tyrrell terms the "first natural law this 
Pinnacle of Reason." Locke describes the first natural law 
as the natural law limitation of immediate need. Tyrrell 
describes the first natural law (a sort of Golden Rule): 
"Not to do to another that which I would not have done to 
myself in the same Circumstances. 11 16 Tyrrell proceeds to 
derive an argument from this law that no other man should 
attempt to deny any other man their interest in property 
because every man is interested in his own self-
preservation.17 The natural law limitation of immediate 
need is only reasonable, "For he that leaves as much as 
15. Tyrrell, 109, 2nd pagination. 
16. Ibid. 
17. Ibid., 109-110, 2nd pagination. 
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another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at 
all. 11 18 Thus, for Tyrrell and for Locke, the beginning of 
man's appropriation of private property was stirred by his 
interest in his own self-preservation. 
After man began to appropriate property for his self-
preservation, property became subject to natural law 
limitations of spoilage and of immediate need. Property 
became subject to spoilage limitations because excess 
property any man appropriates will only become a burden to 
him and deplete the available resources of other men. 
Tyrrell explains the reason for a spoilage limitation: 
that the people do neither need nor desire those 
superflous things that others doe, there is no need of 
enclosing or appropriating any more Land than they 
really make use of, more being but a burthen to them.19 
The limitations of immediate need and spoilage which Tyrrell 
and Locke endorse restrain man from an unlimited 
appropriation of property in a state of nature. 
Despite the impossibility of unlimited appropriation in 
a state of nature, man is able to appropriate his private 
property because he mixed his labor with what was originally 
common property. When man produces private property by 
mixing his labor with common property he is producing the 
labor theory of value. Described in Patriarcha non 
Monarcha, the labor theory of value is as follows: 
18. Locke, Second Treatise, 33. 
19. Tyrrell, 113, 2nd pagination. 
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since the owner hath possessed himself of this land, 
and bestowed his Labour and Industry upon it, and that 
the other hath no right to any more of the products of 
the earth than that may serve for the subsistence of 
himself and his Family, and that there is more around 
but where he may procure himself the like necessaries 
if he please, he hath no right to take away this land 
from the owner without his consent, since he hath 
the same right to this Field as the other hath to his 
cottage or Garden.20 
As this passage shows, the labor theory of value establishes 
the laborer as the undisputed owner of the property he mixes 
with his labor. In the work of Locke and Tyrrell, the labor 
theory of value acts within the confines of natural law 
limitations to provide a foundation for man's appropriation 
of property from the property given by God in common. 
Locke argues that men institute goverment as a 
protector of private property once they have appropriated 
property through the labor theory of value. Although 
Tyrrell is in conflict with Locke because he argues that 
government is instituted by men as an answer to regulating 
an expanding population, he does accept that government is 
instituted by men. Men are responsible for the powers 
government possesses because they are responsible for the 
institution of government. In fact, "the powers of 
government are based entirely on powers transferred to them 
by individuals, and governments have no rights that are 
particular to them."21 Locke believes all men are born with 
20. Ibid., 112, 2nd pagination. 
21. Wootton, 80. 
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the right to defend their freedom because they are born 
entitled to their freedom. To defend their natural freedom, 
men must "judge of, and punish the breaches of that Law in 
others. 11 22 To judge and punish others, men establish 
government and instill it with the power to make and execute 
laws "as the publick good of the Society shall require. 11 23 
Although Locke presented the argument that men transfer 
powers to the government, it may have been Tyrrell who 
was the first to grasp the possibility of treating 
governments as having rights no different in kind from 
those of individuals in a state of nature, while 
insisting those rights were not ..• unlimited.24 
According to Tyrrell, the power the people possess in their 
ability to punish the king is evidence that they instill the 
government with its power. Tyrrell describe this belief: 
the Power of the people to resist and punish kings, in 
which I shall say no more, than that a Prince who is 
subject to be so punished, is not really a king, in the 
sense that the word king ought to be understood, since 
a king is properly one that hath no Superior, and 
consequently is not capable of Punishments; all 
punishments as I said before, being properly the 
effects of a Superior, over an Inferior.25 
Because people have instituted government and instilled it 
with its powers, they are superior to the agents of the 
government.26 
22. Locke, Second Treatise, 88. 
23. Ibid., 89. 
24. Wootton, 80. 
25. Tyrrell, 116, 2nd pagination. 
26. Tyrrell's insistence that the people are over the 
government reveals that he is not an absolute monarchist. 
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In essence, people in a state of government are living 
within both a state of nature and political society. Locke 
explains that the Executive Power is what "might be most 
subservient to the publick good. 11 27 Tyrrell agrees with 
Locke and argues that people have the choice of following 
the government or not following the government. He writes, 
we should allow this way of compulsion to the People, 
it will follow that both the King and the People do 
still live in a natural liberty, or meer state of 
nature.28 
When people have the option of following the government 
which they instituted and granted powers to, they are 
ultimately only bound by natural law. Once men agree to 
institute government, they grant government the 
responsibility to act as a judge between men. Government is 
granted this power because men need a judge to replace the 
freedom from and equality to everyone else that men enjoyed 
in a state of nature. Nevertheless, even under government 
people remain their own final judge, as natural law 
dictates. 
Both Locke and Tyrrell believe that property predates 
government. For Locke, the reason that property is created 
is the protection of private property. If property must be 
protected, and government is instituted to be that 
protector, then property must predate government. Tyrrell 
27. Locke, Second Treatise, 167. 
28. Tyrrell, 132, 2nd pagination. 
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is more blatant in his statements meant to clear up "this 
great difficulty which hath puzzled some Divines, which is 
prior in nature, Propriety or civil government. 11 29 He 
simply explains 
it is apparent, Propriety, understood either as the 
application of natural things to the uses of particular 
Men, or else as the general agreement of many men in 
the division of a Territory, or kingdom, must be before 
Government, one main end of which is to maintain the 
Dominion of Property before agreed on.30 
On the surface of their political theories, Locke and 
Tyrrell appear to be mirrors of each other. Each man 
incorporates into his writing the ideas that men are born 
with a right to freedom, are originated in a state of nature 
which is essentially peaceful, are able to appropriate 
property because of the labor theory of value, and are able 
to grant government its powers after the creation of 
property. In all of these ideas, the two political 
philosophers reveal their stance as natural-law theorists of 
late seventeenth century England. Locke and Tyrrell refuted 
Filmer and his historical arguments while including issues 
of liberty vital to the time when they were writing. 
Yet profound differences remain between the political 
theories of Locke and Tyrrell. While both men agree that 
man is born with a right to freedom and to consent to the 
instituion of government, they disagree as to what 
29. Ibid., 16, 2nd pagination. 
30. Ibid. 
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constitutes membership into government. Tyrrell ultimately 
takes a more realistic stance about the basis of membership 
in a polity. 
While Macpherson would have us believe that there was a 
major break between Locke's state of nature and state of 
political society, Locke clearly sees the law of nature as 
binding in both states.31 However, Locke does not accept 
that government replaces the state of nature or is 
automatically inclusive of all men. Instead, he believes 
that government is bound by the law of nature and is 
accepted only when people reach an age of majority.32 In 
contrast to Tyrrell, Locke believes a return to the state of 
nature is always an option. He writes, 
For a Man, not haveing the Power of his own Life, 
cannot, by Compact or his own Consent, enslave himself 
to anyone, nor put himself under the Absolute, 
Arbitrary Power of another, to take away his Life, when 
he pleases. Nobody can give more Power than he has 
himself; and he that cannot take away his own Life, 
cannot give another power over it.33 
As this passage illustrates, because men do not have 
unlimited natural rights, they do not have the power to 
grant government power to supersede natural law. People 
cannot be subject to a government which supersedes the 
31. See the appendix (below) for Macpherson's 
interpretation. 
32. See the appendix (below) for Tully and Shader-
Frechette•s interpretations of Locke's work, which reveal 
that government is guided by man's foundation of rights in 
natural law. 
33. Locke, Second Treatise, 23. 
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rights they enjoy in a state of nature: 
the Conquered, or their Children, have no Court, no 
Arbitrator on Earth to appeal to. They then may appeal 
••. to Heaven, and repeat their Appeal, till they 
have recovered the native Right of their Ancestors, 
which was to have such a Legislature over them, as the 
Majority should approve, and freely acquiese in.34 
Unlike Locke, Tyrrell accepts the existing government 
as replacing the state of nature and as a very inclusive 
institution. Also unlike Locke, Tyrrell would accept 
absolute governments as legitimate because men can be 
compelled to give up their personal rights under some 
circumstances. The strongest example he provides is of a 
captor and slave, similar to Locke's conqueror and 
conquered: 
Thus a Slave and Argiers though it is the occesion of 
his servitude his being taken Prisoner, yet the true 
Cause of his becoming a lawful Servant to his taker, 
does not proceed from his conquering him, that he shall 
be dismiss'd of his Fetters, or Imprisonment, upon 
Condition he will serve faithfully and not run away.37 
Thus, Tyrrell will accept a contract for slavery within the 
confines of government. If this type of contract is 
accepted, then the natural law limitation of someone not 
being able to surrender their right to freedom is rejected. 
If this right is rejected, then the road to absolute 
government is open as a possible and much larger extension 
of an individual contract for slavery.36 
34. Ibid., 176. 
35. Tyrrell, 122, 2nd pagination. 
36. Notice, however, that even in slavery a person has 
a contract. Ultimately, it is the individual's choice, 
although limited by circumstance, to become a slave. After 
all, slavery is usually considered to be better than death. 
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While Tyrrell accepts government as a replacement for a 
state of nature, necessarily inclusive of every man who owns 
property, Locke will not consider government as inclusive of 
anyone who has not made that choice after coming of age. 
While Locke and Tyrrell concur the legitimate authority of 
any goverment is founded upon consent, they do not agree if 
government accepts men as born subjects. If men have to 
consent to the authority of government, everyone has to 
accept that individual freedom must predate the institution 
of government. If individual freedom predates government, 
as a corollary, men cannot be born as subjects of the 
government. 
Locke expresses this corollary in his Second Treatise, 
where he states that while people "conclude they are 
naturally Subjects as they are Men," governments "understand 
it otherwise. 11 37 Government does not accept a child as a 
born subject because it does not want to admit the child to 
privileges of that country.38 Presenting an argument of 
nonage, Locke explains that each man is under his father's 
guidance, and not his government's, until "he comes to Age 
of Discretion" when he is at liberty to choose "what 
Government he will put himself under; what Body Politick he 
will unite himself to."39 According to Locke, because men 
37. Locke, Second Treatise, 117, 118. 
38. Ibid., 118. 
39. Ibid. 
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are more a subject of their parents than of their 
government's until the "Age of Discretion," they are not 
born as subjects of their government. 
In contrast, Tyrrell does not believe that government 
does not accept men as born subjects. Instead, he believes 
that laws consider men to be born as subjects. Tyrrell 
explains, by positive laws "there is a native Allegiance due 
by the Laws of divers Countries precedent to any Oath."40 
Unlike Locke, Tyrrell believes that government accepts men 
as born subjects. 
Locke and Tyrrell also disagree as to what entitles 
membership to political society. On one hand, Tyrrell 
believes that all goods carry membership to society with 
them. He states that any man who holds land or goods is 
"bound to obey" and "likewise to maintain" government 
because 
it is just and reasonable that those that claim under 
such first possessors, should, if they like to enjoy 
the Lands or Goods, perform the Conditions annexed to 
them 
once the institutors of government tied the possession of 
goods to the maintenance of the government.41 According to 
Tyrrell, possession of land or goods is not the only thing 
that entitles membership to society. Even people who do not 
own land or goods should accept the responsibilities of 
40. Tyrrell, 87. 
41. Ibid., 86. 
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membership to society because they also "enjoy the common 
benefits of the government. 11 42 Tyrrell accepts both 
proprietors and non-proprietors as members of society, which 
includes their responsibility to maintain the government. 
Locke disagrees with Tyrrell because he will not accept 
that proprietors of land or goods are bound to maintain 
their government. This disagreement reveals that Locke is 
more radical than Tyrrell. Locke would accept that 
proprietors of the land have given their tacit consent to be 
members of society because they enjoy governmental 
protection of their land and liberties.43 However, Locke 
makes a distinction between tacit consent and express 
consent. Express consent puts beyond any doubt that man is 
"a perfect Member of that Society, a Subject of the 
Government. 11 44 Tacit consent does not involve any express 
statement of membership in a government but reveals an 
agreement to maintain that government while the person 
enjoys its privileges. Locke explains, 
The Obligation any one is under, by Virtue of such 
Enjoyment, to submit to the Government, begins and ends 
with the Enjoyment; so that whenever the Owner, who has 
given nothing but such a tacit Consent to the 
Government, will, by Donation, Sale, or otherwise, quit 
the said Possession, he is at liberty to go and 
incorporate himself into any other Commonwealth, or to 
agree with others to begin a new one.45 
42. Ibid., 87. 
43. Locke, Second Treatise, 119-120. 
44. Ibid., 119. 
45. Ibid., 121. 
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In addition, people who do not own property, even though 
they enjoy the "Priviledges and Protection" of a 
government's laws are not "a Member of that Society" unless 
they have given their express consent to be members.46 
Locke does not include proprietors or non-proprietors as 
members of society, unless they have given their express 
consent to be so, which means they do not have a continuing 
responsibility to maintain government. Locke's exclusion is 
radical because he does not portray government as an 
institution which men must obey. 
While Tyrrell accepts anyone enjoying the priviledges 
of government to be members of that government, Locke 
establishes a criteria of the need for express consent for 
someone to become members of society. Locke's criteria 
accepts landholders as members of society who have given 
tacit consent which will end when they no longer enjoy 
governmental privileges over that land when that land no 
longer belongs to them. For both Locke and Tyrrell, men 
will no longer be members of society only when the 
government violates their right to self-preservation, 
whether they are landholders or not. 
The express consent criteria which Locke presents in 
the Second Treatise will keep individuals from giving as 
much of their liberty to government as Tyrrell will allow. 
46. Ibid., 122. 
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This criteria limits what actions man may be held 
accountable for, so that he can never be held accountable 
for accepting an absolute government. If man has limits for 
what he can be held accountable for, his actions are 
necessarily limited. Locke explains the need for self-
preservation will always precede man's responsibility to 
government: 
the first and fundamental positive Law of all 
Commonwealths is the estblishing of the Legislative 
Power; as the first and fundamental natural Law, which 
is to govern even the Legistlature it self, is the 
preservation of the Society, and (as far as will 
consist with the publick good) of every person in it.47 
In contrast, Tyrrell believes man must fulfill the 
responsibility he is assigned by government. Tyrrell's idea 
that man is held responsible to government echoes Tully's 
socialist interpretation of Locke's work.48 However, 
Tully's critique undermines man's individual rights under 
government, especially to property, and as such, can be used 
to highlight Tyrrell's rather than Locke's position. Like 
Tyrrell's argument, Tully's interpretation revolves around a 
necessity of governmental regulation over men. In Tyrrell's 
writing, government is portrayed as an institution which men 
must obey. 
Even more vital to the political theories than the 
distinction of whether man is ultimately responsible to 
47. Locke, Second Treatise, 134. 
48. See the appendix (below) for Tully's 
interpretation. 
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government, is the contrast between Locke and Tyrrell's 
breadth and definition of property. Because each man holds 
a different opinion why government was created, Locke places 
a greater importance upon property. 
While Locke sees the creation of government as 
necessary for the protection of property, Tyrrell sees the 
creation of government as a result of an expanding 
population. As land is appropriated and utilized to its 
fullest extent, Tyrrell explains, 
there will presently arise a necessity of division of 
lands in the first place; and of Trade abroade, in the 
next; or else the People must either discharge 
themselves into their neighbours territories, or live· 
by robbing, or playing the Pyrates upon their 
neighbours.49 
The stress that a large population puts upon a limited 
amount of available land creates the need for a government 
to keep order. Tyrrell contends that government must make 
"laws to maintain this Propriety and punishments ordained 
for them, that disturb it. 11 50 
In contrast, Locke argues people do not necessarily 
overpopulate the land that is available for their 
appropriation. None of the three main interpretations of 
Locke consider overpopulation as the reason for the 
institution of government and Locke explicitly denies this 
reason in the Second Treatise. He explains, 
49. Tyrrell, 113, 2nd pagination. 
50. Ibid., 114. 
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Labour, in the Beginning, gave a Right of Property, 
where ever any one was pleased to imploy it, upon what 
was common, which remained, a long while, the far 
greater part, and is yet more than Mankind makes use 
of .51 
Although he accepts that land was appropriated to a great 
extent, Locke will not accept that the land is overpopulated 
because common property still exists. In agreement with 
Macpherson's analysis of his work, Locke claims government 
came into existence to protect property after men consented 
to the use of money, which allowed them to appropriate 
property beyond their immediate needs.52 
The distinctions between Locke and Tyrrell's beliefs in 
the natural right to freedom and their breadth of property 
is highlighted by Tyrrell's assumption that the creation of 
political society eliminates all previous property rights. 
Wootton interprets Tyrrell's work to mean that personal 
relationships are replaced with legal relationships once 
man institutes government.SJ On the other hand, Locke's Two 
Treatises revolve around the idea that political society is 
created to protect natural property rights rather than 
eliminating them for rights determined by the government. 
Following this distinction, the possessive 
individualist critique of Locke's work, which states that 
there is a major break between a state of nature and a state 
of political society, seems more appropriate for Tyrrell's 
51. Locke, Second Treatise, 45. 
52. Ibid., 45. 
53. Wootton, 85. 
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work. Locke's definition of property, which includes both 
property in one's self and one's rights, holds in both a 
state of nature and in political society. In contrast, when 
Tyrrell refers to property, his discussion considers 
property as a right of ownership, which is guided by 
governmentally determined laws rather than by laws of 
nature. Tyrrell's discussion of property relies on a break 
between a state of nature and political society; Locke's 
discussion needs a smooth transition from a state of nature 
to political society. Tim Harris illustrates the difference 
between Tyrrell's and Locke's definitions of property in a 
seventeenth century context: 
property in the late seventeenth-century was a complex 
concept, possessing various layers of meaning. The 
term could be used in a narrow sense meaning goods 
and possessions, as it was • . • by the Whig James 
Tyrrell . . • Yet property could also refer to anything 
which might be peculiar or proper to one person, to 
anything which might be said to enjoy the possession of 
by private right. Thus, John Locke could argue that 
men enjoyed a property in their life and liberty, as 
well as estates.54 
While Locke's definition bridged the economic and the 
ideological, reflecting material goods and ideal benefits, 
following the continuing seventeenth century trend, 
Tyrrell's discussion of property does not.55 As Harris 
explains, Tyrrell regards property as material goods, and 
54. Harris, "'Lives, Liberties, and Estates,'" 220. 
55. See the introduction for its discussion of the 
evolution of the concept of property in seventeenth-century 
England. 
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does not extend it to ideal benefits. Thus, the possessive 
individualist critique might be more to analyze Tyrrell 
because he insists that governmental laws replace a man's 
natural law limitations, which are fundamental in Locke's 
property theory. 
Furthermore, while both Tyrrell and Locke accept the 
labor theory of value, only Tyrrell accepts occupancy as a 
right to property. Tyrrell has even been criticized for 
being confusing in mixing arguments of labor with 
occupancy.56 Ashcraft suggests that Tyrrell may have taken 
this approach because he took the defensive in the nature of 
property rights and did not want the Whigs to appear as 
Levellers. As a result, his argument from occupancy makes 
his theory appear as "a wholesale endorsement of existing 
property relations, whatever their form or social 
utility."57 On the other hand, Locke relies solely on the 
mixture of a man's labor with property to create ownership. 
Therefore, Locke's political theory appears more consistent 
and without possibilities of conflict. 
Both Locke and Tyrrell accept that property had 
originally been held in common as a gift from God. The 
Whigs had been pushed to this position by their acceptance 
of natural law arguments, needing to demonstrate that men 
were entitled to their property rights because they had 
56. Ashcraft, 251. 
57. Ibid., 282. 
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originated in a state of nature. In Patriarcha non 
Monarcha, Tyrrell explains that occupancy "confers a Right 
in the state of Nature to such things as are meerly 
necessary for a mans subsistence. 11 58 Like labor, occupancy 
is subject to natural law limitations (such as need, 
subsistence) in a state of nature, laying a foundation for 
property rights. Unfortunately, through his historical 
references, an argument for property rights from occupancy 
only confuses the issue. Tyrrell's historical references 
and analogies justify Ashcraft's statement that he attempted 
to justify existing property relations. For example, 
Tyrrell claims that 
the Ancient Germans, from whom our Saxon Ancestors 
descended, and of which nation they were a part, never 
knew what belonged to an absolute despotick power in 
their Princes. And after the Saxons coming in, and the 
Heptarchy having been erected in this Island, the 
Ancient form of Government was not allowed.59 
As this passage reveals, Tyrrell is far from denying the 
legitimacy of an absolutist government. Instead, Tyrrell 
simply insists the English never experienced an unlimited 
government. He writes, 
the government of the West-Saxons which was that on 
which our Monarchy is grafted was not despotical, but 
limited by Laws, that the king could not seise mens 
lands or goods without Process ••• [in addition] as 
there is no man that is but moderately versed in the 
history, and Laws of his Country, but very well knows; 
and that this opinion of Englands being a limited 
Monarchy is no new one, but owned to be so by our 
kings themselves.60 
58. Tyrrell, 65. 
59. Ibid., 149. 
60. Ibid., 150. 
111 
Because Tyrrell differs from Locke in accepting an argument 
from occupancy as a foundation for property rights, he can 
be presented as a defender of absolutist governments; at the 
very least, he does not deny that these governments can 
legitimately exist, though they have not historically 
existed in England. 
Tyrrell attempts to redress how private property 
originated from common property in Patriarcha non Monarcha. 
Tyrrell, while trying to support existing property 
relations, takes some aims to distance himself from the 
people, "the rabble or the disordered multitude."61 For 
example, he argues that only individual adult males have to 
consent to political authority for the authority to be 
accepted: 
it be esteemed a perfect Democracy . . . where only 
free men, or at their own dispose, and such who were 
supposed first to have by their meeting together 
instituted this Government • . • I see no reason why 
there should not be looked upon as representing the 
whole promiscuous body of the people.62 
Tyrrell offers the historical example of Athens, "which all 
must grant to be so," as a democracy which only needed the 
consent of males who had the opportunity to hold property to 
assume its political authority.63 Using historical 
arguments to justify his theory, Tyrrell attempts to move 
away from representing the people as a whole. By doing so, 
61. Ashcraft, 305. 
62. Tyrrell, 74. 
63. Ibid. 
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while Tyrrell believes private property arose from the 
common, he has to neglect the role of original common 
property because he stresses the importance and role of 
property holders instead of every man's ability to 
appropriate property for himself. 
At the opposite extreme, Locke devoted his Second 
Treatise to the evolution of mankind as a whole from a state 
of nature towards the institution of government as a 
protector of every individual's natural property rights. As 
the interpretation given by Shader-Frechette demonstrates, 
Locke's work is dependent on the division of the original 
common into private property. The Two Treatises is not an 
attempt to defend existing property relations, as Tyrrell's 
work is, but an explanation of why every man has natural 
property rights, both economic and ideological, that must be 
protected. Locke links his political theory to every man's 
individual rights, not just the landholder's rights. In 
contrast, Tyrrell argues that property in common means as 
much as what a man can use.64 In essence, common property 
as the original form of property is Tyrrell's justification 
that no man can take the natural right to sustenance from 
another man because all men originally had the right to take 
their own property from the common. Nevertheless, Tyrrell's 
acceptance of the original common is nothing mar~ than a 
64. Daly, 90. Also, Tully's interpretation of what the 
English common meant to Locke can be applied to Tyrrell. 
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negative consent which men follow in a state of nature. 
This negative consent changes when men agree to 
governmentally determined laws, replacing the laws of 
nature. He explains his acceptance in Patriarcha non 
Monarcha, involving the argument that occupancy leads from 
common to private property: 
a Property of occupancy or the personal possession of 
and applying it to the use of one or more men while 
they have need of it, may very well consist with 
community, and is absolutely necessary to the 
preservation of mankind.65 
As this passage shows, Tyrrell advocates that when common 
property is divided into private property by rights of 
occupancy (giving theater seats as his example), men 
necessarily agree that their right to preservation has been 
served. As a result, men will not debate the other man's 
right to the property that man occupies. By giving a 
negative consent, man believes his own right of occupancy 
will not be challenged. The original common property did 
not provide "an absolute positive, or unalterable communion 
of every man pro indiviso" because, if it did, "the Products 
of the earth could have contributed nothing to the ends for 
which they were designed by God viz: the preservation and 
Propagation of the species of Mankind."66 In Tyrrell's 
opinion, if man was originally in a primitive state of 
communism, holding all property in common, their best 
65. Tyrrell, 99, 2nd pagination. 
66. Tyrrell, 109-110, 2nd pagination. 
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interests of self-preservation would not be served.67 
On the other hand, Locke--and all major interpretations 
of his work--accepts that there was a primitive stage of 
communism within the state of nature. Predating the 
institution of government, Locke's stage of communism 
enjoyed common property. This common property would be 
appropriated through the labor theory of value into private 
property. The men who appropriated from the English common 
enjoyed the natural right to self and were limited by 
natural law restrictions of spoilage. While Tyrrell agrees 
that men in a state of nature are entitled to self-
preservation and limited by natural law restrictions in 
their attempts at appropriation, he will not accept that man 
ever lived in a primitive stage of communism. In providing 
a critique of the progression of property rights in defense 
of existing property relations, Tyrrell accepted arguments 
from history. These historical arguments advanced the idea 
that the English knew a history of monarchy limited by the 
consent of the people, rather than a background of 
communism. Tyrrell does not adequately explain what form of 
social organization man experienced while holding property 
in common, if they did not experience communism. On the 
other hand, Locke did embrace man's existence in a state of 
67. Although Tyrrell agrees with Tully's interpretation 
of Locke in many respects, he does not in arguing that there 
could not have been an original primitive form of communism. 
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nature (a theoretical construct), where he enjoys property 
in common. Locke's critique of man's evolution of property 
rights is not as realistic as Tyrrell's because he was much 
more systematic in explaining a state of nature which never 
existed. Locke's theory is more abstract; Tyrrell's more 
historical. 
Locke's insistence that government exists to defend 
property rights controlled by natural law and to guarantee 
man his freedom is a radical break from Tyrrell's arguments 
in Patriarcha non Monarcha. Despite their similarities in 
arguing that man is born with a natural right to freedom, 
grants government its powers, and arises from a peaceful 
state of nature which experiences the labor theory of value, 
their striking contrasts lead to profound differences in 
property theory. While Wootton may claim that "Tyrrell's 
Patriarcha non Monarcha was the immediate cause of the 
Second Treatise" upon a sound argument, and Tyrrell himself 
would state that "whoever writ it [the Two Treatises] . 
agreed perfectly with my conceptions in Patriarcha non 
Monarcha," the two political works contain drastic 
differences because Tyrrell was more realistic.68 
In an attempt to distance himself from the people as a 
whole while defending existing property relations, Tyrrell 
presented a more real world approach than Locke. In 
contrast, Locke's more abstract, systematic approach was 
very revolutionary in nature. Although both men accept 
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patriarchal origins of the state, Locke is the only one that 
would not entertain any ideas for justification of unlimited 
monarchy. Tyrrell provides a sharp example, that of slave 
and captor, which might produce an unlimited monarch. 
Tyrrell attempted a more practical explanation of political 
theory than Locke, relying upon both arguments from history 
and arguments based on natural law. On the other hand, 
Locke used only natural law arguments to provide 
justification for man's right to freedom and appropriation 
of property as a means of self-preservation. Locke was 
eventually accepted as the master innovator by relying 
solely on arguments from natural law, but Tyrrell's work was 
more relevant to the time in which it was written. 
68. Wootton, 60. Quoted in Gough, 597. 
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Conclusion 
John Locke and James Tyrrell were political theorists 
who reflected the issues of the exclusion crisis, when 
modern political parties were starting to form. The Two 
Treatises and Patriarcha non Monarcha were distinctly 
Whiggish. Locke and Tyrrell wrote against the assumed Tory 
spokesperson, Sir Robert Filmer. 
Filmer's Patriarcha, published at least forty years 
after it was written, suited the Whig-Tory debates perfectly 
because it presented an argument for absolute monarchy. 
Filmer derived the necessity of absolute monarchy from an 
interpretation of Genesis which stressed that the world's 
goods were originally given by God to Adam and that these 
absolute property rights had descended to the present 
monarch. Filmer's interpretation of the Bible, centering on 
the Fifth Commandment, also allowed for an innovative 
patriarchal theory, where fatherly and kingly power were the 
same, and not just analogous. Using examples of biblical 
history, Filmer's Patriarcha was representative of the 
standard Tory position of supporting absolute monarchy as a 
way of providing order to late-seventeenth century England. 
Locke and Tyrrell went to great pains to refute Filmer. 
Property issues, which had first been taken up by Filmer 
because he believed Englishmen considered them as their 
greatest liberty, became a major focus of each response. 
During the seventeenth century, which experienced the first 
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legal definition of property in print and an evolution of 
the term to denote both economic and ideological rights, 
property became the major focus of political debate. After 
each side presented its political stance, the Whigs have 
since been viewed as defenders of property rights against a 
Tory party which defended absolute monarchy. However, the 
writings of Locke, Tyrrell, and Filmer defend the position 
that each party felt it was attempting to defend the 
established Church and State. 
In attempting to refute Filmer, Locke and Tyrrell moved 
from relying on historical examples to natural law. Rather 
than offering an historical interpretation of the Bible, 
which Filmer did in Patriarcha, Locke and Tyrrell used 
natural law as a basis for their political theories. Their 
political theories stress that man is born with the natural 
right to freedom, evolving from a peaceful state of nature 
towards instituting government for the protection of 
property. By not centering on historical examples, the 
natural law theories of Locke and Tyrrell could not be 
proved incorrect. Although they may not have admitted it at 
the time, they helped to establish the validity of abstract 
political theories while avoiding historical debates they 
would lose. 
Ultimately, despite the many similarities between The 
Two Treatises and Patriarcha non Monarcha, Tyrrell revealed 
himself as a more practical political theorist than Locke. 
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Although both men agree that private property is 
appropriated from the original common, Tyrrell also accepts 
occupancy as a right to private property. By accepting 
occupancy as a right to private property, Tyrrell defends 
existing property conditions, including the fact that he 
does not deny the possibility of a legitimate absolute 
government. In contrast, Locke denies that absolute 
government is ever legitimate and proposes a positive 
community of property where every man is entitled to 
property rights. On the other hand, Tyrrell does not 
present a positive community of property rights but rather a 
negative community where individuals have their rights 
because other men do not protest against what that man holds 
as private property. Also, Tyrrell considers all men, 
whether they hold property or not, as members of society; 
Locke only accepts property members as having given a tacit 
consent to fulfill the responsibilities of government, but 
this responsibility is only lasting with an express consent. 
In several respects, Tyrrell and Locke differ in terms of 
their property theory. 
While Tyrrell's property theory is not now considered 
as the equal of Locke's, it probably seemed more convincing 
to his contemporaries. When his contemporaries, both Whig 
and Tory, feared possible results of the succession 
controversy, Tyrrell defended existing property conditions. 
Although he would not accept that every absolute government 
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was illegitimate, he attempted to show that proprietors and 
non-proprietors alike hold responsibilities to government. 
Although he believed that all Englishmen hold responsibility 
to their government, which replaced the state of nature, 
Tyrrell also advanced the idea that only men who had the 
opportunity to hold property need consent to a government 
for its authority to be valid. In advancing this idea, 
Tyrrell distances himself from the people as a whole, 
speaking particularly for men of property. His conception 
of property, in fact, reveals who he speaks for because it 
does not follow the view which would become common in the 
late eighteenth century of property as both an economic and 
ideological conception, but rather a purely economic one. 
Most importantly, he used historical examples to support his 
arguments. Although an importance has been placed on the 
Whig movement from historical arguments to natural law, 
Tyrrell incorporates them both into his work. This 
incorporation suggests that he bridged historical political 
realities with abstract political philosophy. A political 
theory which defended existing property relations, not 
extending property rights to ideological rights for 
everyone, while bridging historical political realities with 
abstract political philosophy would have been convincing to 
Tyrrell's contemporaries: an audience of Tory and Whig 
parties which were still elitist. That theory is exactly 
what Tyrrell presented in Patriarcha non Monarcha. 
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Locke, on the other hand, whether Laslett or Ashcraft's 
dating of the Two Treatises is accepted, wrote with a more 
universal purpose in mind. While Tyrrell was a spokesman 
for the Whig party at the time of the Exclusion Crisis, 
making his writing more historically important for that 
period, Locke's purpose extended beyond that of his friend; 
he acted as Whig spokesman for a radical, though not 
republican, wing of the party which was writing for 
posterity as well as their own cause. Locke's purpose has 
since drawn attention as a Whig spokesman for future 
generations. His political theory, although based around 
terms that he does not adequately explain (natural law, 
state of nature, government by consent, etc.), leaves out 
historical examples completely. His elimination of 
historical examples, coupled with his dual conception of 
property, establishes Locke as a Whig natural law theorist 
that extended beyond the exclusion crisis. His property 
theory reflected the seventeenth century trend of turning 
property into a concept which covered both economic and 
ideological liberties, as the varied interpretations of his 
work reveals. Locke wrote for a universal audience; Tyrrell 
wrote for his contemporaries. 
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Appendix 
Major Interpretations of Locke's Theory of Property: 
Possessive Individualism, Justification of the English 
Common, State-Welfare Capitalism 
Although it is clear that Locke's theory of property 
focuses on man's movement from a state of nature to 
political society, certain ambiguities can be found in the 
Second Treatise. The major ambiguity which can be found 
with Locke's property theory is that he gives two ambiguous 
definitions of property, neither of which is very specific. 
This ambiguity has led to differing interpretations of which 
economic system Locke supports: the "possessive 
individualism" described by C.B. Macpherson, the socialism 
of the English common argued for by James Tully, and a type 
of land-use planning detailed by Kirstin Shader-Frechette. 
Spanning the extremes from Tully to Macpherson, Locke can be 
found to support most property theories because, as Laslett 
suggests, if historical texts are treated how the authors 
want, "we can prove just what we like from them."1 In 
addition, the presence of "two distinct conceptions of 
ownership in his (Locke's] thought," which "are, in many 
cases, conflictory," allows for different possibilities in 
interpretation.2 
Locke's property theory can support the idea of 
possessive individualism. This idea was presented by C.B. 
Macpherson in his now-classic The Political Theory of 
1. Laslett, "Introduction," 91. 
2. Schwarzenbach, 141. 
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Possessive Individualism, Hobbes to Locke. Possessive 
individualism is a concept based on the assumptions "that 
man is free and human by virtue of his sole proprietorship 
of his own person, and that human society is essentially a 
series of market relations."3 In short, possessive 
individualism describes men as greedy in nature, who have a 
goal of unlimited appropriation of capital. Macpherson 
admits the concept "has a large, if ambiguous, place in 
Locke's political theory."4 This admittance lends credence 
to the belief that his theory can be proven if an author 
specifically looks for justification of it within Locke's 
writing. In fact, Macpherson expands, justification for 
possessive individualism "appear in the theories as 
uncertain mixtures of assumptions about fact and assumptions 
about right" which "tend to be beneath or beyond the notice 
of both philosophical and historical critics."5 After all, 
assumptions are sometimes more important than explicit 
statements; if someone can be fairly sure that Locke 
intended to support something, it is more risky to avoid the 
attempt than to make it. The warnings given in the 
introduction to The Political Theory of Possessive 
Individualism are ample evidence that no one should read any 
interpretations of what Locke's theory supports without 
3. C.B. MacPherson, The Political Theorv of Possessive 
Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (London, England: Oxford 
University Press, 1962), 270. 
4. Ibid., 2. 
5. Ibid., 4. 
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reservations. 
In a study of possessive individualism, Locke's theory 
of property must be understood before his theory of 
political government can be understood. This condition is 
essential because possessive individualism is constructed 
around an argument that in a state of nature individuals 
were created in the form of market man, predating political 
government.6 Once given life as a market man, each 
individual is free from any relationship he does not enter 
into with his own interest in mind. As a result of only 
acting on their own behalf, individuals make society "a 
series of relations between proprietors" where political 
society is nothing but a "contractual device for the 
protection of these people and their relationships."7 
The theory of possessive individualism accepts natural 
law as man's guide in a state of nature, conceding that 
man's appropriation of property is limited by immediate 
need, spoilage, and the use of man's own labor only.8 Other 
than these three limitations, individual appropriation is 
justified by man's natural right to self-preservation and 
the use of his own labour. Because each man is entitled to 
appropriation within the state of nature, what was 
originally given to mankind in common is divided among men 
as personal property.9 This division leads to possessive 
6. Ibid., 269. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid., 201. 
9. Ibid. 
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individualism's disregard of communal ownership. Before man 
has entered into political society, according to the theory 
of possessive individualism, natural law has led to the 
individual appropriation of the common into personal 
property. 
Although natural law is a guiding force in a state of 
nature, when man eventually enters into political society, 
natural law will no longer be binding on man's actions. 
According to the theory of possessive individualism, Chapter 
Five of the Second Treatise must be read as removing the 
"'bounds of the Law of Nature' from the natural property 
right of the individual."10 After a reader accepts this 
condition, Locke's work can be read as an argument for a 
right of unlimited appropriation, which surpasses the three 
limitations placed on man within a state of nature. 
Natural law is binding within a state of nature only 
until the introduction of money. After man has put a value 
on money, a commercial society without civil society becomes 
possible. Money signals both the end of unappropriated land 
and the removal of the limitations of natural law. The 
signals of money's influence are found in the Second 
Treatise: 
10. Ibid., 199. 
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This I dare boldly affirm, That the same Rule of 
Propriety (viz.), that every Man should have as much as 
he could make use of, would hold still ••• had not 
the Invention of Money, and the tacit Agreement of Men 
to put a value on it, introduced (by consent} larger 
Possessions, and a Right to them.11 
This passage shows that money signals the end of natural law 
because once money is introduced, man is able to purchase 
more goods than what he immediately needs. 
In addition to eliminating the natural law limitation 
of appropriation to immediate needs, the use of money 
eliminates the natural law limitations of spoilage and the 
use of man's labor only. According to the theory of 
possessive individualism, appropriation beyond the limits of 
natural law takes on a positive virtue because it assumes 
that an increase by one person (signalling an increase in 
the whole} will either benefit or not make anyone's position 
any worse.12 Furthermore, a new relationship is created by 
appropriation beyond the limits of natural law; a wage 
relationship. A wage relationship is created because a man 
will be able to purchase another man's labor through the use 
of money. This relationship eliminates the limitation of 
the use of man's labor only because one man can buy another 
man's labor. For the theory of possessive individualism, "a 
commercial economy in which all the land is appropriated 
implied the existence of wage-labour."13 Following this 
11. Locke, Second Treatise, 36. 
12. Macpherson, 212-214. 
13. Ibid., 217. 
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theory, a commercial economy, even without the existence of 
political society, indicated the end of natural law 
limitations because of the use of money. 
Although Macpherson believes that his discussion of 
Locke's property theories restored to them the meaning they 
"must have had for Locke and his contemporaries," the theory 
of possessive individualism is not without its faults.14 
The theory insists that natural law limitations do not 
extend past the introduction of money into political 
society, that men are greedy, and that governmental property 
regulation should be ignored. The insistence that natural 
law limitations do not extend into political society is 
misleading because, after claiming that the Fifth Chapter of 
the Second Treatise is a justification that the laws of 
nature do not extend into political society, Macpherson 
writes "the whole theory of property is a justification of 
the natural right not only to unequal property but to 
unlimited individual appropriation."15 So, even though 
natural law limitations may not extend into political 
society, natural rights arising from natural law are the 
justification for individual appropriation after the 
institution of money. In other words, natural law and 
natural rights do bridge the state of nature and the state 
of political society. In a reading of Locke's Two 
14. Ibid., 220. 
15. Ibid. I 221. 
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Treatises, natural law must be seen as essential to Locke's 
property theory because it shifted the argument away from 
history and to man's obligation to natural law. Any author 
who does not clarify Locke's reliance on natural law is 
neglecting something vital to Locke's writing. One of 
Macpherson's problems is that, although he makes this point, 
he does not clarify it, leaving the role of natural law in 
political society uncertain in the theory of possessive 
individualism. 
Despite problems in the theory of possessive 
individualism, Macpherson's work does provide many strong 
points. One of the theory's strengths is that it attempts 
to put Locke's property theory within the framework of the 
time it was written. For Macpherson, Locke's property 
theory reveals the seventeenth century movement of property 
definition from the ideological to the economic. While 
stressing the importance of property for economic theory, 
Locke is also providing a vital ideological tool in 
describing the evolution of political society and the 
expanse of property, based on natural law. 
Another strength of Macpherson's work is the drawing of 
a division between those who own property and those who do 
not, although this division is not explicitly stated in 
Locke's work. This division implies that people who own 
land are the only individuals who can become full members of 
society because they are the people most interested in the 
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protection of property, the chief end of government. This 
idea reveals a deeper division of political society between 
those who have a marked interest in government and those who 
do not, which supports the strongest point of possessive 
individualism; property theory must be understood, and is 
essential, to understand Locke's political theory. 
Although Locke may be considered as a supporter of 
possessive individualism, James Tully contends that his work 
stresses the justification of the English common instead. 
Tully's A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His 
Adversaries responds to Macpherson. Tully focuses his study 
on the argument that Chapter Five of the Second Treatise was 
not written as a discussion regarding the origin of 
property. Rather, the chapter was written as a way "of 
showing that his [Locke's] alternative to Filmer's Adamite 
theory is practicable, chapter five is directed against 
Filmer."16 Tully believes the origin of property was 
described in the First Treatise where Locke attempts to 
overthrow Filmer's "theological premiss" and establish 
"natural law and man's obligation to it" so that private 
dominion cannot be seen as absolutist.17 In his attempt, 
Locke discovers that "property is right in common" and 
"equivalent to dominion in common," in contrast to Filmer's 
idea of the "'exclusive' private dominion" of Adam and his 
16. Tully, 96. 
17. Ibid. I 53. 
130 
heirs. Upon Locke's discovery, Tully develops a thesis 
which argues that Locke's work is a justification of 
property derivation from the English common. 
Rather than an argument for unlimited appropriation of 
property, Locke's work is a justification that everyone is 
able to use different goods from the English common, but not 
determine their use as part of their private property. 
According to Tully, all men were granted "the common right 
to use, not the common right to use".18 In addition, 
although all men were granted this right, they were not 
granted that right over all things, but only in those things 
necessary to preservation. Locke's "property or 
right in common" is a "subjective use right" which means 
that a person has "a right or moral power to something" but 
not to ownership in that thing.19 
To accept Locke's work as a justification of the 
English common, a reader must assume that private property 
was established after the institution of political society. 
As Locke explains in the Second Treatise, 
it was commonly without any fixed property in the 
ground they made use of, till they incorporated, 
settled themselves together, and built Cities, and 
then, by consent, they came in time . • • by Laws 
within themselves, settled the Properties of those of 
the same Society.20 
18. Ibid., 97. Notice in this quote that use is 
written twice. Use can be both a verb and a noun. In this 
quote, the first time that use is written is as a verb and 
the second time it is written is as a noun. 
19. Ibid., 60. 
20. Locke, Second Treatise, 38. 
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According to this passage, people consented to private 
property after they incorporated themselves into political 
units. Further into the Second Treatise, Locke writes: 
the several Communities settled the bounds of their 
distinct Territiories, and by Laws within themselves, 
regulated the Properties of the private Men of their 
society, and so, by Compact and Agreement, settled the 
Property which labour and Industry began.21 
By presenting this second passage, Locke explains that 
governments became regulators of property for the common 
good. 
Because individuals created private property after 
instituting government, private property could not be 
natural. As Locke writes, 
by the Labour that removes it out of that common state 
Nature left it in, made his Property who takes that 
pains about it.22 
Although what goods would eventually become property existed 
in nature, they did not become property until man interfered 
by claiming them as his own. After government is created, 
the rights of property come into existence through 
regulatory laws and "positive constitutions."23 
According to Tully, the role of government in 
regulating property is the focus of Locke's fifth chapter of 
the Second Treatise. Through governmental regulation, 
"particularization of the natural common is possible."24 
21. Ibid. I 45. 
22. Ibid. I 30. 
23. Ibid., 50. 
24. Tully, 100. 
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When the natural common is particularized, its property 
divided for different uses, each man is able to acquire the 
means necessary for support and comfort by using the 
property assigned for particular uses. Because the common 
consists of much more than just land, a reader must not read 
"'property' as a term comprising unconditional rights over 
land and so equate it with 'private property.'"25 Instead, 
all goods in common must be considered as property, linking 
them as objects which can be used for the good of all but 
will not become private property. Ultimately, 
The fundamental and undifferentiated form of property 
is the natural right and duty to make use of the world 
to achieve God's purpose of preserving all his 
workmanship. A commonwealth which arranges men's 
actions accordingly is the complementary kind of 
society.26 
Property and political society, both creations of man, are 
necessary in directing man's life. Government, as the 
regulatory agent of the common, is important because it 
provides men with the property necessary for preservation. 
One of the major weaknesses of Tully's interpretation 
is that he is inconsistent in detailing any connection 
between property and natural law in the Two Treatises. In 
fact, no connection at all is stressed. Tully only briefly 
refers to the very strong connection between natural law and 
property. He alludes to the connection by describing 
Locke's property theory "as a natural right to exercise 
25. Ibid., 124. 
26. Ibid., 173. 
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sovereignty over what is legally one's own."27 His allusion 
is negated, however, when he claims that property is not 
natural. Although Tully emphasizes the fact that Locke had 
to rely upon an explanation of property and equality 
consistent with natural law, it seems highly improbable that 
he would be able to do this if property did not exist in a 
state of nature, his origin of political man. One of the 
major weaknesses of Tully's interpretation is that he is 
inconsistent in detailing any connection between property 
and natural law in the Two Treatises. 
Tully's contention that political society predates 
private property is another weakness which can be found in 
his work. This weakness eliminates the reason that man has 
for entering into government; the protection of private 
property. Tully provides no other reason for the 
institution of government as a replacement for a peaceful 
life within a state of nature. He merely argues that man 
created government and then created the institution of 
property which was regulated by the government. 
Essentially, this is the same thing as saying that 
government was created to preserve property which was going 
to be instituted because the government would be able to 
regulate it. There is little difference in saying that 
government is created for the protection of private property 
27. Ibid., 172. 
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rather than the regulation of property. Either way, 
according to Locke, government was created with property in 
mind, and not as an institution separated from man's 
interest in property. 
Even if someone can accept Tully's conclusion that 
government predates private property, this conclusion is 
based on a misreading of the Second Treatise. Tully's major 
support for an argument that government predates private 
property never states that government had been created.28 
Instead, the passage suggests only that the people collected 
themselves into "distinct Territories" and made "Laws within 
themselves." These laws were possibly laws of custom rather 
than laws of government. Also, collecting a group of people 
into a territory does not constitute government. Locke 
tells us that a government needs an established law, a 
judge, and the power to enforce the decisions of the judge. 
At most, the passage Tully uses only contains an established 
law of the three conditions. The passage he uses most 
likely argues that society, not government, was in place 
when men first started to recognize property. George Sabine 
explains that English society and English government are two 
different things, the second existing for the well-being of 
the first.29 Perhaps in Tully's argument, individuals 
entered into society, instituted property, and then created 
28. Locke, Second Treatise, 38. 
29. Sabine, 535. 
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government. According to Sabine, Locke "is nowhere clear as 
to what precisely does arise by the 'original compact,'" 
questioning whether society arises or government.JO In 
Tully's argument there was a compact and it may have led 
only to society. 
Resting between readings of Locke's Two Treatises that 
contend he either justifies unlimited accumulation of 
property or the English common, is an interpretation that 
stresses his endorsement of welfare-state capitalism. This 
interpretation can be found in Kirstin Shader-Frechette•s 
article, "Locke and Limits on Land Ownership." Shader-
Frechette writes, although "Locke ought not be interpreted 
in any doctrinaire, ideological way," his writings may 
justify a "welfare-state capitalism that includes land-use 
planning. 11 31 In essence, this interpretation opts for a 
middle ground between a traditional capitalist analysis and 
a socialist analysis. 
A middle interpretation is more solid than either 
unlimited appropriation or socialist interpretations because 
it emphasizes the role of natural law in Locke's theory in 
both a state of nature and political society. It is unlike 
the analysis of unlimited appropriation, which does not 
"account for the moral demands of Locke's 'Law of Nature' 
30. Ibid., 532. 
31. Kristin Shader-Frechetter, "Locke and Limits on 
Land ownership," Journal of the History of Ideas 54 (April 
1993): 201. 
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and its eternal, rather than historical, character."32 In 
contrast, a reading which supports welfare-state capitalism 
insists that the law of nature does not end historically 
with the transition from a state of nature to political 
society. 
A welfare-state interpretation of the Second Treatise 
also differs from a socialist interpretation because of the 
role of natural law in each. In a socialist interpretation, 
there is not a natural right to property in civil society. 
In contrast, a welfare-state capitalist interpretation, 
where natural law is found as a guiding factor in both a 
state of nature and political society, stresses that people 
are entitled to property because of their natural 
rights. 
In a welfare-state capitalist interpretation, private 
property evolves from common property originally given by 
God to mankind. Because property was originally held in 
common by all men, the state of nature was a form of 
primitive communism. Unfortunately, Locke does not define 
the state of nature very clearly, leading many commentators 
to miss the need to explain a transition from common 
property to private property. Locke does write, 
I shall endeavour to shew, how Men might come to have a 
property in several parts of that which God gave to 
Mankind in common, and that without any express Compact 
of all the Commoners.33 
32. Ibid., 202. 
33. Locke, Second Treatise, 25. 
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A welfare-state capitalist interpretation of Locke's writing 
accepts that private property, created before the 
institution of government, arose from common property. 
The basic justification for private property, arising 
from common property, is the labour theory of value. 
Accepted as virtually unchallengeable, this theory entitles 
people to whatever they produce by their own labor.34 
Rather than losing one's labor, mixing one's labor entitles 
ownership for several reasons. These reasons include that 
it is efficient for appropriation to be based on labor, 
people who labor are industrious and rational and deserve 
the results of their labor, and that labor is often 
responsible for a thing's value.35 Despite these reasons, 
some portion of land value is not created by human labor. 
As Locke explains, 
if we will rightly estimate things as they come to our 
use, and cast up the several Expenses about them, what 
in them is purely owing to Nature, and what to labour, 
we shall find, that in most of them 99/100 are wholly 
to be put on the account of labour.36 
Although 99/100 is a very high percentage of value owed to 
labor, it is not an absolute debt. When there is any land 
that has some value not created by human labor, that land 
cannot be appropriated and must remain in the common.37 Any 
land left in the common will be subject to land-use-planning 
34. Shader-Frechette, 202. 
35. Ibid., 205. 
36. Locke, Second Treatise, 40. 
37. Shader-Frechette, 215. 
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for the common good. 
Even property that owes all of its value to labor has 
restrictions placed upon it regarding possible appropriation 
because of natural law. Land and other property can only be 
appropriated if there is enough remaining for others and if 
it is put to productive use. The only way that these 
restrictions can be enforced is if property is regulated by 
the government.38 Locke writes, "in Governments the Laws 
regulate the right of property, and the possession of land 
is determined by positive constitutions."39 
According to the welfare-state capitalist 
interpretation of Locke's writing, justification for 
governmental regulation of property is natural law. This 
interpretation endorses the belief that the law of nature 
continues into political society because the latter is 
implemented to enforce the law of nature. The power of 
government cannot exceed the power of natural law, 
For it being but the joynt power of every Member of the 
Society given up to that Person or Assembly, which is 
Legislator, it can be no more than those persons had in 
a State of Nature before they enter'd into Society, and 
gave up to the Community. For no Body can transfer to 
another more power than he has iri himself .40 
Because governmental power cannot supersede the power of 
natural law, the restrictions of natural law hold for all 
time, even with governmental regulation of property. 
38. Ibid., 202. 
39. Locke, Second Treatise, 50. 
40. Ibid., 135. 
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Natural law restrictions upon property act to counter 
the economic and political power of the people who injure 
others through their accumulation of property. Unlike the 
traditional capitalist interpretation, a welfare-state 
capitalist interpretation of Locke's writing claims that 
"Locke never denied the right to preservation or subsistence 
as a consequence of the consent to money."41 According to 
both theories, money allows for an inequality in property 
among men and aids in the transition to political society as 
a means of protecting those with property. However, in a 
welfare-state capitalist interpretation, unlike the 
traditional capitalist interpretation, natural law is 
eternal so that there is not an overemphasis upon change 
from a state of nature to a state of political society. On 
the other hand, natural law is not considered as a guiding 
force in political society under the traditional capitalist 
interpretation. As a result, in the traditional analysis, 
an unlimited appropriation of goods under the protection of 
government suggests that there is a marked difference 
between a state of nature and political society. 
In addition, under the traditional capitalist 
interpretation no details are given considering that 
extensive accumulation can only be justified if it benefits 
others.42 According to Locke, "the great Law of Nature," 
41. Shader-Frechette, 40. 
42. Ibid., 217. 
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which holds in both the state of nature and political 
society, is "Who so sheddeth Mans Blood, by Man shall his 
Blood be shed. 11 43 Applying this rule to the appropriation 
of property, no man will be able to appropriate property if 
it hurts someone else because they will then have the law of 
nature--revealed in established law--turned against them for 
a redress of grievances. Under governmental regulation, the 
appropriation of property will be limited to only what will 
maximize production and improve the conditions of mankind.44 
Locke describes these regulations: 
Yet this could not be much, nor to the Prejudice of 
others, where the same plenty was still left, to those 
who would use the same Industry. To which let me add, 
that he who appropriates land to himself by his labour, 
does not lessen but increase the common stock of 
mankind.45 
Supported by this passage, men cannot have access to 
unlimited appropriation of property unless their 
appropriation both improves and maximizes production while 
not being detrimental to the conditions of other men. 
These interpretations of Locke's Second Treatise, which 
differ largely in their consideration of natural law and the 
role of property in society. Of the three, Macpherson's 
possessive individualism, Tully's justification of the 
English common, and Shader-Frechette's state-welfare 
capitalism, Shader-Frechette's state-welfare capitalism is 
43. Locke, Second Treatise, 11. 
44. Shader-Frechette, 217. 
45. Locke, Second Treatise, 37. 
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most accurate because it considers the role of natural law 
most fully in man's evolution from a state of nature to 
political society. Only in a state-welfare capitalist 
interpretation is natural law a binding force in both a 
state of nature and political society. According to the 
theory of possessive individualism, there is a major 
transition from a state of nature to political society where 
the bind of natural law is broken. On the other hand, 
according to a reading of the Second Treatise which stresses 
a justification of the English common, a natural right to 
property does not exist in political society. 
The three given interpretations of Locke's Second 
Treatise also differ in regard to his property definition, 
which contains a dual conception of material goods and ideal 
benefits (also categorized as stewardship and private 
property).46 These descriptions are connected because men 
are put in stewardship of their ideal benefits and can 
consider their material goods as private property. 
Stewardship, one of the dual conceptions, is linked 
with ownership, where men possess something originally 
obtained as a gift. Examples of things that man is steward 
to are his life, liberty, and natural freedom.47 All of 
these gifts are given by God and man must act responsibly 
with these gifts to show he is grateful to God for them. 
46. Schwarzenbach suggests this alternate terminology. 
47. Ibid., 146. 
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The conception of stewardship suggests that property is part 
of a person's being which must be guarded. Government 
becomes the conditional guardian of these gifts, which can 
be considered man's natural rights, when man enters into 
political society. Because stewardship explains an easier 
transition towards the establishment of government, it 
reveals a problem in any attempt to reconcile possessive 
individualism with Locke's writing. While Macpherson's 
theory stresses that there is a marked difference between a 
state of nature and political society, the concept of 
stewardship found in Locke's work reveals there is not a 
marked difference between these two states because man is 
steward of his natural rights in both. Thus, stewardship 
destroys one of Macpherson's major foundations in his 
interpretation of Locke. Stewardship, arising from man's 
possession of his natural rights, helps lead to the 
transition towards government as the protector of property. 
Private property, the second of the dual conceptions, 
describes something earned by one's own efforts and is 
similar to the tangible goods portion of Locke's property 
definition, which can include land. Unlike property held in 
stewardship, people can dispose of their private property at 
will, without alienating part of their personal being.48 
Private property is similar to the tangible goods portion of 
48. Ibid., 148. 
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Locke's property definition and can include land. The 
conception of private property within his work reveals that 
Locke "intends to argue for a more extensive private 
ownership" than Tully claims he does.49 People are entitled 
to private property under government, destroying Tully's 
argument that in political society people do not have a 
natural right to property. While destroying Tully's 
argument, the conception of private property as a dual 
conception of ownership highlights the economic portion of 
Locke's definition of property. 
Although contrasts between the three interpretations of 
Locke's work can be drawn, especially regarding their 
consideration of natural law and property, it is important 
not to put too much emphasis on these distinctions. The 
importance of the differing interpretations hinges on the 
fact that Locke's work can be demonstrated to support any of 
them, because he was not specific in defining property, 
natural law, a state of nature, or government. Strikingly, 
he provided a dual conception of property which leads to 
confusion about what property theory he does support. In 
part because of the confusion surrounding Locke's dual 
conception, in the final analysis only Locke's own judgement 
can stand on what property theory he meant to justify. As 
there is no truly accurate way to interpret his theory, it 
49. Ibid., 153-4. 
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has been criticized as "incomplete, not a little confused 
and inadequate to the problem as it has been analyzed since 
his day."50 
Despite the confusion, Locke has much to offer as a 
political theorist. Just the fact that his work has been 
able to support so many interpretations reveals that his 
work has a universal applicability. More importantly, the 
several interpretations of Locke's property theory 
demonstrates that there is a deep interest in what Locke has 
to say because his political theories are appealing to a 
wide audience; from a socialist that interprets his work as 
an endorsement for unlimited accumulation of property to a 
scholar who interprets his work as an endorsement of a 
socialist system. 
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